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IT’S NOT TOO DIFFICULT: A PLEA TO
RESURRECT THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFENSE
Ken Levy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that I go to the local mall in the hopes of stealing people’s
wallets. After an hour of reaching into various pockets, however, I have
yet to claim any success. If a policeman were to witness my activity, he
would certainly have probable cause to arrest me for attempted theft.
And it would not help me either with him or with a judge to argue that all
of the pockets I picked were empty and therefore that it was impossible
for me actually to commit theft. The fact that external circumstances (an
absence of wallets) did not “cooperate” with my intent is merely bad
luck, not a good defense.
One might infer from this scenario that the “impossibility defense”
is doomed from the outset. But this inference is fallacious. The impossi-
bility defense actually works in certain kinds of situations. Still, it can be
very difficult to figure out what these situations are. Indeed, the impossi-
bility defense is one of the thorniest issues in criminal law. Some of my
fellow criminal law professors have told me that they either confess their
irremediable confusion to their students or simply avoid teaching the sub-
ject. Similarly, most jurisdictions have followed the Model Penal Code
(MPC)1 and concluded that the impossibility defense is so hopelessly con-
fused that it should be abandoned altogether.2
* Holt B. Harrison Associate Professor of Law, LSU Law Center. I would like
to thank Russell Christopher for reading an earlier draft of this Article and offering
very constructive feedback and Ray Diamond for many helpful discussions about the
impossibility defense and for his encouragement in writing this Article. I would also
like to thank the editors at New Mexico Law Review for their excellent revisions and
suggestions.
1. See infra Part V.A.
2.  See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605 (1995) (“In Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966), we expressed reservations about the ‘continuing va-
lidity [of] the doctrine of ‘impossibility,’ with all its subtleties,’ in the law of criminal
attempt . . . .”); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
distinction between factual and legal impossibility is elusive at best . . . . Most federal
courts have repudiated the distinction or have at least openly questioned its useful-
ness. . . . [T]his circuit has properly eschewed the semantical thicket of the impossi-
bility defense in criminal attempt cases . . . . ”) (citations omitted); United States v.
Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199–200 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[W]e are the only circuit which continues
225
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The authors of the MPC and its followers worried that courts were
falling for too many defendants’ bogus impossibility claims.3 These de-
fendants had typically tried to commit a crime such as selling controlled
substances or committing statutory rape and failed only because the peo-
ple whom they had solicited were undercover officers.4 The MPC and its
followers reasoned that even though the undercover officers made it im-
to recognize a common law defense of legal impossibility.”); id. at 199 (“[T]he great
majority of jurisdictions have now recognized that legal and factual impossibility are
‘logically indistinguishable’ . . . .”) (citations omitted); United States v. Berrigan, 482
F.2d 171, 186 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[W]e are informed that elimination of impossibility as a
defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and
the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with ‘the overwhelming modern
view’ . . . .”) (citation and footnotes omitted); Lawhorn v. State, 898 S.W.2d 886, 891
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“The doctrine of impossibility has been labeled by scholars,
judges and commentators alike as one of the most evasive issues in the criminal
law.”); Commonwealth v. Henley, 474 A.2d 1115, 1117 n.2 (Pa. 1984) (listing states
that have abandoned the impossibility defense); State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 503
(N.J. 1968) (“The defense of impossibility in a prosecution for an attempted crime has
resulted in a confused mass of law throughout the country . . . . Our examination of
these authorities convinces us that the application of the defense of impossibility is so
fraught with intricacies and artificial distinctions that the defense has little value as an
analytical method for reaching substantial justice.”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 181 (1998) (“Serious people must smile at the fragility
of [the distinction between cases involving factual impossibility and cases involving
legal impossibility]. As critical a question as criminal liability for an attempted offense
should not turn on distinctions that hardly convey a material difference.”); John Has-
nas, Once More Unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and
Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (“There is little
question that in most American jurisdictions the defendants would have no grounds
on which to appeal their convictions. Thirty-seven states have explicitly eliminated
impossibility as a defense to a charge of attempt and the federal circuits that have not
done likewise have so limited the range of application of the defense as to render it
virtually a dead letter.”) (footnotes omitted); Audrey Rogers, Protecting Children on
the Internet: Mission Impossible?, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 323, 347 (2009) (stating that the
impossibility defense had been almost universally abolished or abandoned by the late
1990s); Robert E. Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal Criminal Law Needs a
General Attempt Provision and How Military Law Can Provide One, 78 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1043, 1068–69 (2010) (“The Model Penal Code would abolish the entire doctrine
of impossibility for a number of reasons . . . . Many jurisdictions have already abol-
ished impossibility by either statute or case law . . . . [M]ilitary law has done away
with the impossibility defense . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(a), 309 (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985) (“[T]he courts [have] exonerate[d] defendants in situations where at-
tempt liability most certainly should be imposed. In all of these cases the actor’s
criminal purpose has been clearly demonstrated; he went as far as he could in imple-
menting that purpose; and, as a result, his ‘dangerousness’ is plainly manifested.”).
4. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 871–72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964).
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possible for the crimes to be consummated, the defendants should still
have been found guilty of attempt on the grounds that they were genu-
inely guilty of attempting to commit serious crimes and the standard law-
enforcement practice of using undercover officers to catch criminals
should be encouraged rather than discouraged.5
I agree with the MPC that these defendants should have been con-
victed and punished. But it does not follow that the MPC was right to
abolish the impossibility defense. On the contrary, the MPC—and all the
jurisdictions that followed it—threw out the baby with the bathwater.
While they were right to throw out one version of the impossibility de-
fense—factual impossibility—they were wrong to throw out another ver-
sion of the impossibility defense: legal impossibility.6 The fact of the
5. See United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 907 n.16 (3d Cir. 1983) (“We note
that if impossibility were a defense [for attempted distribution of controlled sub-
stances], the harm loosed upon the public is not merely that would-be drug dealers
must be freed to try again. Allowing the defense here would also gut law enforcement
efforts to infiltrate drug supply chains. The government goes undercover not only as
purchaser, as in the instant case, but as seller, or as middleman . . . . If such impossi-
bility is a defense, the government will be forced to furnish real drugs or abandon
hope of obtaining attempt convictions.”) (footnotes omitted); People v. Rojas, 358
P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1961) (“[T]he criminality of the attempt is not destroyed by the
fact that the goods, having been recovered by the commendably alert and efficient
action of the Los Angeles police, had, unknown to defendants, lost their ‘stolen’ sta-
tus, any more than the criminality of the attempt in [another case] was destroyed by
impossibility caused by the fact that the police had recovered the goods and taken
them from the place where the would-be receiver went to get them. In our opinion
the consequences of intent and acts such as those of defendants here should be more
serious than pleased amazement that because of the timeliness of the police the pro-
jected criminality was not merely detected but also wiped out.”); People v. Jaffe, 185
N.Y. 497, 503 (1906) (Chase, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mere fact that an under-
cover sting frustrated the defendant’s attempt to break the law does not mean that the
defendant did not attempt to break the law).
6. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 203 (“[W]e conclude that legal impossibility is not a de-
fense to conspiracy.”); State v. Salerno, No. CR 92 0080796, 1993 WL 88327, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1993) (noting that Congress eliminated the legal impossi-
bility defense for attempted possession of a controlled substance); Andriy Pazuniak,
A Better Way To Stop Online Predators: Encouraging A More Appealing Approach
To § 2422(B), 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 691, 699–700 (2010) (“Courts . . . have con-
sistently rejected legal impossibility as a valid defense to an attempt charge under [18
U.S.C.] § 2422(b) [which prohibits attempts to “persuade[ ], induce[ ], entice[ ], or co-
erce[ ]” a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity]. Some courts reject the defense by
recharacterizing it as a factual impossibility defense, which courts generally consider
an invalid defense to criminal-attempt charges. Other courts reluctantly accept the
predator’s legal impossibility defense for the sake of argument and then reject it on
the basis of legislative intent by holding that Congress did not intend for legal impos-
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matter is that the legal-impossibility version of the impossibility defense
is perfectly valid.
As I will explain further in Part IV, factual impossibility and legal
impossibility are two different kinds of impossibility and therefore two
different kinds of reasons why attempts to commit crimes are doomed to
failure. A given attempt to commit a crime is factually impossible if an
external circumstance prevents my attempt from succeeding.7 In the
pickpocketing example above, my attempts to steal wallets were frus-
trated by the absence of wallets in the pockets that I reached into. This
absence is an external circumstance and therefore qualifies as factual im-
possibility. On the other hand, a given attempt to commit a crime is le-
sibility to constitute a defense to an attempt charge under § 2422(b).”) (footnotes
omitted).
7. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199 (“[F]actual impossibility is said to occur when extra-
neous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent consumma-
tion of the intended crime.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d
881, 883 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Factual impossibility occurs when the objective of the de-
fendant is proscribed by the criminal law but a circumstance unknown to the actor
prevents him from bringing about that objective.”) (citation omitted); Berrigan, 482
F.2d at 188 (“[F]actual impossibility is said to occur when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent consummation of the intended
crime.”); Lawhorn, 898 S.W.2d at 891 (“Factual impossibility is generally regarded as
existing where, due to a physical or factual condition unknown to the actor, the at-
tempted crime could not be completed. Often cited examples of factual impossibility
include the attempt to pick an empty pocket, attempt to kill with an unloaded or
defective weapon, attempt to kill with poison that was not capable of producing
death, attempt to steal from an empty house, attempt to conduct an abortion on a
woman who was not pregnant.”) (citations omitted); People v. Rollino, 233 N.Y.S.2d
580, 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (“[W]here the basic or substantive crime is impossible of
completion, simply because of some physical or factual condition unknown to the
defendant, [is] a situation which is usually described as a ‘factual impossibility’.”);
Grill v. State, 651 A.2d 856, 858 (Md. 1995) (“LaFave and Scott . . . characterize fac-
tual impossibility as ‘that in which the defendant is unable to accomplish what he
intends because of some facts unknown to him.’”); Audrey Rogers, New Technology,
Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
477, 494 (2004) (“Factual impossibility exists when a defendant’s efforts to commit a
crime fail because a factual or physical circumstance necessary for the crime to be
completed is missing. To use a classic example, had the victim’s pocket been full of
money, the defendant pickpocket would have successfully completed his attempt and
would have stolen the victim’s money. In other words, to use the Collins court’s basic
rationale, the attempt would have been carried out successfully had the facts been as
the defendant intended.”) (footnote omitted); Wagner, supra note 2, at 1066 (“Factual R
impossibility is where the crime cannot be committed because of some physical cir-
cumstance unknown to the actor . . . .”).
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gally impossible if I am trying to break a law that simply does not exist.8
If, for example, I stick out my tongue at others in the belief that this is an
illegal act, what renders my attempt to break the law impossible is simply
the fact that this act is not illegal. There is no law preventing me from
sticking out my tongue at whomever I want.
In Part VI.A, I will further distinguish between two kinds of legal
impossibility. The first kind, which I just described, is the attempt to
break a law that does not exist. The second kind, which is probably much
more common, is the attempt to break a law that does exist by acting in a
way that does not come close enough to what the law prohibits. The per-
son who believes that she is breaking the law by sticking her tongue out
at others falls into the first category if she mistakenly believes that there
is a distinct Anti-Tongue-Sticking-Out statute and into the second cate-
gory if she mistakenly believes that sticking her tongue out at others vio-
lates the assault statutes. Ironically, while the second version of legal
impossibility is much more overlooked than the first, it is also more im-
portant. Indeed, it is this version of the impossibility defense that prima-
rily motivates my plea for its resurrection.
8. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199 n.16 (“Another type of legal impossibility—‘pure’
legal impossibility—occurs when the law does not even ‘proscribe the goal that the
defendant sought to achieve.’”) (citations omitted); Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 883 (“Legal
impossibility occurs when the actions which the defendant performs or sets in motion,
even if fully carried out as he desires, would not constitute a crime.”) (citations omit-
ted); Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188 (“Legal impossibility is said to occur where the in-
tended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.”); id. at 190
(“[A]ttempting to do that which is not a crime is not attempting to commit a crime.”)
(footnote omitted); State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (“It is
no offense to attempt to do that which is not illegal.”) (citation omitted); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 175 (2000) (describing legal impossibility as
a situation in which “the actor thinks that he is engaged in a crime and yet, due to his
mistaken view of the law, it turns out that his activity is perfectly legal.”); Larry Alex-
ander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay
in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 LAW & PHIL. 33, 55 (1993) (describing a case of “true
legal impossibility” as a situation in which “if all the facts were as [a person] believed
them to be, and even if he was to accomplish all that he believed necessary to com-
plete the crime, he nevertheless would not have committed any crime.”); Rogers,
supra note 7, at 495 (“The first [type of legal impossibility] is ‘pure’ or ‘true legal R
impossibility’ which exists when what the defendant is attempting to commit is actu-
ally not a crime. Notwithstanding a defendant’s subjective bad intentions, he is not
guilty of any crime. Pure legal impossibility is the mirror image of the ignorance of the
law doctrine: while ignorance of an existing law criminalizing a defendant’s conduct
cannot exonerate a defendant, ignorance of the lack of a law criminalizing a defen-
dant’s conduct cannot inculpate him.”) (footnotes omitted).
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The validity of both versions of the legal-impossibility defense de-
rives from a fundamental precept of criminal justice:9 the principle of le-
gality, which is also known as nullem crimen sine lege or nulla poena sine
lege.10 The principle of legality forbids punishing an individual for com-
9. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (“[A] prosecution to
enforce one application of [18 U.S.C. § 242’s] spacious protection of liberty can
threaten the accused with deprivation of another: what Justice Holmes spoke of as
‘fair warning . . . in language that the common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the
line should be clear.’ . . . ‘The . . . principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be pro-
scribed.’”) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)); McBoyle, 283
U.S. at 27 (“Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be
given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the
law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possi-
ble the line should be clear. . . . [T]he statute should not be extended to [unmen-
tioned elements or items] simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy
applies, or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely
broader words would have been used.”); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619,
633–34 (1970) (“The first essential of due process is fair warning of the act which is
made punishable as a crime. ‘That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on
their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law.’ . . . ‘No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids.’ . . . This requirement of fair warning is reflected in the consti-
tutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws . . . . When a new
penal statute is applied retrospectively to make punishable an act which was not crim-
inal at the time it was performed, the defendant has been given no advance notice
consistent with due process. And precisely the same effect occurs when such an act is
made punishable under a preexisting statute but by means of an unforeseeable judi-
cial enlargement thereof.”) (quoting Connally v. General Contra. Co. 269 U.S. 385
(1926); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); In re Newbern, 53 Cal.2d 786
(1960); and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)); Heyward D. Armstrong,
Rogers v. Tennessee: An Assault on Legality and Due Process, 81 N.C. L. REV. 317,
321 (2002) (“The principle of legality is a ‘basic premise’ of criminal law.”) (footnote
omitted); id. at 334 (“[A]t the core of legality is the idea that retroactively changing
the law to criminalize previously innocent conduct, or retroactively increasing the
penalty for criminal conduct, is ‘unjust.’”).
10. See Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 186 (“Professor Williams asserts that ‘[i]t should
need no demonstration that a person who commits or attempts to commit what is not
a crime in law cannot be convicted of attempting to commit a crime, and it makes no
difference that he thinks it is a crime.’ Professor Hall is equally insistent that to make
such conduct a criminal attempt would violate the principle of legality.”) (footnotes
omitted); Lawhorn, 898 S.W.2d at 891–92 (“[U]nless the intended end is a legally
proscribed harm, causing it is not criminal, hence any conduct falling short of that is
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mitting an act that the state had not designated as criminal at the time
that the individual performed the act.11 Likewise, the legal-impossibility
not a criminal attempt ( i.e. the principle of legality) . . . .”) (citations omitted);
FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 178 (“English and American commentators typically ap- R
proach [the problem of legal impossibility] by arguing that ‘unless the intended end is
a legally proscribed harm,’ no conduct in furtherance of that end can constitute a
crime. The claim is that this rule derives from the principle of legality.”) (footnote and
citation omitted); Alexander, supra note 8, at 46 (“The principle behind the treatment R
of pure legal impossibility—that it cannot be the predicate of attempt liability—is that
we cannot punish people under laws that are purely the figments of their guilty imagi-
nations. Let us call this the dancing principle component of the principle of legality, a
reference to our example of someone who dances believing dancing to be prohibited.
The dancing principle rests not on any concerns about culpability or dangerousness—
after all, those it shelters have displayed at least the willingness to be scofflaws—but
on the more practical consideration that there is no actual law to charge defendant
with attempting to violate and no actual punishment prescribed for its attempted
violation.”).
11. There are three reasons why the principle of legality is so important. First, it is
fundamentally unfair—not to mention unconstitutional—to try, convict, or punish a
person for performing a certain act when she was never told that this act was against
the law. Second, as a practical matter, public promulgation of the laws helps maximize
social order by giving citizens the certainty that they need to plan their lives and
projects. Third, clearly stated laws constrain police’s, prosecutors’, judges’, and juries’
discretion. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“As generally stated,
the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal of-
fense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement.”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 209 (1971) (“[I]f . . . statutes are
not clear in what they enjoin and forbid, the citizen does not know how he is to
behave.”); Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law
of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129 n.2 (“One of the critical func-
tions of a criminal code is to provide notice to citizens of what conduct is prohib-
ited . . . . Providing notice . . . has obvious practical value, for citizens can hardly be
expected to obey the law’s commands if they are unaware of them, or cannot under-
stand them.”); Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of
Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 359–60 (2005) (“The Supreme Court has stated that
‘[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State com-
mands or forbids.’‘[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning.’) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453 and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972); id. at 361 (“‘[S]tandards allow the addressees to make individualized judg-
ments about the substantive offensiveness or nonoffensiveness of their own actual or
contemplated conduct . . . . [P]ersons will be deterred from engaging in borderline
conduct and encouraged to substitute less offensive types of conduct.’”) (quoting
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985)); id. at 362–63
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version of the impossibility defense forbids punishing an individual for
attempting an action that was not criminal—even if she mistakenly be-
lieved that the act was criminal. It follows that the status of the very cru-
cial principle of legality depends on the status of the impossibility
defense. To the extent that we abandon the latter, we also abandon the
former. So if we wish our criminal justice system to live up to its name—a
system that dispenses justice—then we need to learn what exactly the im-
possibility defense says, resolve all of the confusions that now plague it,
and make the legal-impossibility version of it available once again.
One might argue that my plea is exaggerated and that the abolition
of the impossibility defense in most jurisdictions is not a serious problem.
But the impossibility defense derives from the legality principle, which—
again—is one of the foundational axioms of criminal law. So abolishing a
direct derivative of the legality principle is hardly a trivial matter. Of
course, some might dismiss the notion that people could be accused,
tried, and punished for a crime that does not even exist. But the fact of
the matter is that this kind of injustice happens all too frequently. And it
does not just happen in dictatorships. It happens in full-blooded democra-
cies like the United States and the United Kingdom.12
(“Significantly, ‘if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.’ Where the legislature fails
to provide such minimal guide-lines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predi-
lections.’”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; and Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
12. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467–68 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“The Court today approves the conviction of a man for a murder that was not
murder (but only manslaughter) when the offense was committed. It thus violates a
principle-encapsulated in the maxim nulla poena sine lege . . . . Today’s opinion pro-
duces, moreover, a curious constitution that only a judge could love. One in which (by
virtue of the Ex Post Facto Clause) the elected representatives of all the people can-
not retroactively make murder what was not murder when the act was committed; but
in which unelected judges can do precisely that. One in which the predictability of
parliamentary lawmaking cannot validate the retroactive creation of crimes, but the
predictability of judicial lawmaking can do so.”); United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d
257, 265 (2d Cir. 2000) (“At the time of Dauray’s arrest, the statute did not forbid
possession of [ ] a magazine [depicting minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct].
Nor did the statute give Dauray notice that removing several pictures from the maga-
zine, and keeping them, would subject him to criminal penalties.”); Commonwealth v.
Mochan, 110 A.2d 788, 791 (1955) (Woodside, J., dissenting) (“The majority is declar-
ing something to be a crime which was never before known to be a crime in this
Commonwealth. They have done this by the application of such general principles as
‘it is a crime to do anything which injures or tends to injure the public to such an
extent as to require the state to interfere and punish the wrongdoer;’ and ‘whatever
openly outrages decency and is injurious to public morals is a misdemeanor.’ Not only
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have they declared it to be a crime to do an act ‘injuriously affecting public morality,’
but they have declared it to be a crime to do any act which has a ‘potentially’ injurious
effect on public morality.”); Jim Mustian, Gays in Baton Rouge Arrested Under Inva-
lid Sodomy Law, THE ADVOCATE, July 28, 2013, http://theadvocate.com/news/police/
6580728-123/gays-in-baton-rouge-arrested (“[A] man was handcuffed and booked
into Parish Prison on a single count of attempted crime against nature. There had
been no sex-for-money deal between [him and an undercover officer]. The men did
not agree to have sex in the park, a public place. And the count against the man was
based on a part of Louisiana’s anti-sodomy law struck down by the U.S. Supreme
Court a decade ago. The July 18 arrest is among at least a dozen cases since 2011 in
which a Sheriff’s Office task force used [an] unenforceable law to ensnare men who
merely discussed or agreed to have consensual sex with an undercover agent . . . ”);
Jamie Whyte, The Tax Avoidance Rule that Favours Cronyism, CITY AM, Mar. 7,
2012, http://www.cityam.com/article/tax-avoidance-rule-favours-cronyism (“The au-
thorities might punish us even though we have broken no law. Last month the govern-
ment passed retrospective legislation allowing it to confiscate hundreds of millions of
pounds from British banks. It declared that earnings that were not taxable when made
would be treated as if they were. People who were obeying the law by not paying tax
on these earnings will nevertheless be punished if they do not pay them now.”); Scan-
dal of ‘Extremely Dangerous’ Rapist Released Two Months into Sentence after Being
Prosecuted for a Crime that Does Not Exist, MAIL ONLINE, July 19, 2011, http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2016185/Rapist-David-James-Shields-prosecuted-crime-
does-exist.html (“An ‘extremely dangerous’ rapist was freed only two months into his
sentence—because he was prosecuted for a crime that doesn’t exist. Top judge, Mr.
Justice Maddison, slammed the [Crown Prosecution Service]’s mistake as ‘a woeful
state of affairs’, after David James Shields was charged with an offence repealed by
Parliament seven years before his trial.”); Eric Resnick, Man Jailed for Breaking a
Nonexistent Law is Cleared, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRONICLE, Dec. 16, 2005, http://
www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories05/december/1216051.htm (“A gay man who
spent four months in jail for breaking a nonexistent anti-gay sex law has had his name
cleared by an appeals court. Keith Phillips’ conviction of ‘importuning’ was over-
turned . . . ‘In a criminal case, due process requires that the conduct underlying a
finding of guilt actually be a crime,’ Judge Cynthia W. Rice wrote for the court’s
three-page opinion. ‘Here, it was not.’ . . . The city of Warren had prosecuted Phillips
for importuning—asking someone of the same sex for sex, if the person asked was
offended—seven months after it was declared unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme
Court . . . . Phillips was convicted of the nonexistent law twice . . . . Public records
and later court filings show that [the Municipal Judge Thomas] Gysegem and Warren
assistant prosecutor Traci Rose had been notified that the law had been voided, but
Phillips was prosecuted anyway . . . . Gysegem sentenced him to five years probation,
sex offender courses, monitoring of his computer, a six-month suspended jail sen-
tence, and a $600 fine . . . . Phillips says he hopes that during the upcoming suits he
gets answers as to why Rose, Gysegem, and the others did what they did to him while
knowing that the law had been struck.”); Armstrong, supra note 9, at 352 (“Because R
Rogers stopped constraining Bouie’s ‘unexpected and indefensible’ test with the prin-
ciple of legality as embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause, courts have more leeway to
retroactively construe statutes to the detriment of defendants. In Redmond, the court
retroactively abolished an element of a crime, which is abhorrent to legality . . . . By
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Like the two other bedrock principles of criminal justice, propor-
tionality and culpability, the legality principle is all too vulnerable to ero-
sion and disregard. We need then, to be constantly vigilant, quick to
publicize and resist any threats to it—even when these threats originate
from our deepest moral sensibilities. For example, juries might be so
tempted to punish a person who callously let his friend kill a young child
that they disregard the fact that there is no law against bad samaritanism
in that jurisdiction.13 Despicable as this person’s behavior was, it is still
better to refrain from punishing him than to violate the legality
principle.14
removing the principle of legality from the Due Process Clause, Rogers has further
legitimized retroactive judicial decision-making . . . .”) (footnotes omitted); Amy
Pagnozzi, Prison Rape Too Severe a Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT, June 15, 1999,
http://articles.courant.com/1999-06-15/news/9906150133_1_prison-madness-dr-terry-
kupers-raping (suggesting that the American public tacitly approves of prison rape as
a form of punishment “even though there is no law anywhere, federal or state, that
deems rape a fit punishment for anyone whatever their age or crime.”); John Caher,
Charge Doesn’t Exist, So Man May Go Free, TIMES UNION, Feb. 19, 1993, http://
alb.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.wm.request?oneimage&imageid=5670396 (“A Sche-
nectady resident who shot a man may go free because the crime he was convicted of
does not exist. In a terse, three-page memorandum, the state’s top court on Thursday
unanimously agreed to throw out the attempted first-degree manslaughter conviction
of Jose Rivera Martinez. Reason: There is no such crime.”).
13. I have in mind the situation in which David Cash allowed his friend, Jeremy
Strohmeyer, to kill seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson without trying either to stop Jer-
emy or to alert security to the situation. See Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the
Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 GA. L. REV. 607, 623–24 (2010);
Patrick McGreevy, City: Punish ‘Bad Samaritans’, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 16, 1998,
at 3 (“Councilman Richard Alarcon said he was saddened by the whole incident.
‘How he (Cash) could be arrogant and brag about his knowledge of what went on—
that shows I think the very bottom of moral thinking in this country,’ Alarcon said.
‘We should never support, condone nor accept the actions of Mr. Cash. Frankly, I
believe he should be in jail. It was wrong.’”).
14. See United States v. Bodiford, 753 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1985) (“It may be
that conduct like [the defendant’s] should be punished; however, it is elementary that
a defendant may be convicted only of an offense defined by statute, not because his
conduct is reprehensible. Nulla poena sine lege is not only an ancient maxim; it is a
requisite of due process.”) (footnote omitted); Keeler, 2 Cal.3d at 635 (“In the case at
bar the conduct with which petitioner is charged is certainly ‘improper’ and ‘immoral,’
and it is not contended he was exercising a constitutionally favored right. But the
matter is simply one of degree, and it cannot be denied that the guarantee of due
process extends to violent as well as peaceful men. The issue remains, would the judi-
cial enlargement of [the statute in question] now proposed have been foreseeable to
this petitioner?”); Booth, 398 P.2d at 872 (“The defendant in the instant case leaves
little doubt as to his moral guilt. The evidence, as related by the self-admitted and
perpetual law violator indicates defendant fully intended to do the act with which he
was charged. However, it is fundamental to our law that a man is not punished merely
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Bad samaritanism is just one example. There are plenty of others
just like it—acts that many in society find reprehensible but which are
often not legally prohibited for one reason or another: flag-burning;
spanking; indoctrinating children; pornography, including virtual child
pornography and pornography depicting cruelty toward human beings or
animals; bullying and cyberbullying; violating personal confidences; mali-
ciously spreading reputation-damaging rumors that just happen to be
true; publishing highly offensive remarks (such as genocide denial);  par-
ticipating in highly offensive activities (such as a Neo-Nazi rally or anti-
gay protests near funerals); pretending to be a war hero; making counter-
productive business judgments; and recklessly investing other people’s
money in accordance with an equally reckless industry standard. Pick
whichever activity in this list upsets you the most. As long as there is no
law against this activity, the legality principle prevents us from punishing
individuals who engage in it.
If I am correct that we need to remain committed to the legality
principle despite the understandable temptation to abandon it for pur-
portedly reprehensible but still lawful acts, then I am also correct that we
must remain committed to the legality principle’s direct offshoot: the le-
gal-impossibility version of the impossibility defense. And the only way to
remain committed to the legal-impossibility version of the impossibility
defense is to restore our commitment to it. Indeed, even the authors of
the MPC Commentaries, which were published 25 years after the MPC
itself, recognized as much. In a paragraph that arguably amounts to a
major retraction, they stated:
It should . . . be noted that, in order to constitute an attempt
under any of the subdivisions of Subsection (1), it is of course nec-
essary that the result desired or intended by the actor constitute a
crime. If, according to his beliefs as to relevant facts and legal re-
lationships, the result desired or intended is not a crime, the actor
will not be guilty of an attempt, even though he firmly believes
that his goal is criminal. This is in accord with present authority,
and follows . . . from ‘the principle of legality . . . .’15
because he has a criminal mind. It must be shown that he has, with that criminal mind,
done an act which is forbidden by the criminal law.”); Armstrong, supra note 9, at 351 R
(“Just because conduct is reprehensible, and likely should be criminal, does not mean
that defendants should be on fair notice that it actually is criminal—there must be an
underlying law criminalizing the conduct.”).
15. Model Penal Code § 5.01 cmt. 3(c), 318 (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985) (footnotes omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-1\NMX108.txt unknown Seq: 12 14-JAN-15 13:17
236 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
Unfortunately, however, this recognition of the validity of the legal-im-
possibility defense by the very people who helped to abolish it has gone
almost entirely unnoticed.
This Article will attempt to change this situation and resurrect the
legal-impossibility version of the impossibility defense in three steps. In
Parts II through V, I will disentangle legal impossibility from factual im-
possibility, a non-defense with which the former has been thoroughly
confused by sloppy or misguided judges. In Part VI, I will show just how
vital the legal-impossibility version of the impossibility defense is to our
criminal justice system. And in Part VII, I will argue that the attempt to
cause criminal harm by such bizarre means as voodoo or telekinesis falls
closer to legal impossibility than to factual impossibility and therefore
that re-establishing the impossibility defense would help to protect the
otherwise highly vulnerable group of defendants who engage in these
kinds of activities.
II. THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFENSE
If a defendant is charged with attempting to commit a crime, then,
by definition, she has failed to commit the intended crime. If she had not
failed, then she would be guilty of the object crime itself, not attempt,
because attempt and the object crime “merge” into one.16
The impossibility defense is a defense against the charge of at-
tempt.17 A defendant who invokes the impossibility defense is saying that
she is not guilty of attempt because she could not possibly have succeeded
in committing the object offense. Notice, her claim is not that she did not
commit the object offense; her being charged with attempt presupposes
this fact.18 Again, her claim is that she could not have committed the ob-
ject offense.
Bebhinn Donnelly argues that the impossibility defense is somewhat
meaningless because it applies to every failed attempt and would there-
fore exonerate every defendant accused of an attempt crime. Donnelly’s
16. See Dominic T. Holzhaus, Double Jeopardy and Incremental Culpability: A
Unitary Alternative to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1707
n.67 (“[A]ttempts, which may be separately prosecuted where the crime is aborted,
are merged into the crime itself where the attempt is successful.”).
17. It can also be a defense against intent crimes. See Lawhorn v. State, 898
S.W.2d 886, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
18. See State v. Salerno, No. CR 92 0080796, 1993 WL 88327, at *6 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 23, 1993) (suggesting that the defendant’s claim “that the state must prove all
the elements of the predicate crime before a person can be convicted of an attempt to
commit that crime” amounts to the absurd claim that the state must prove the predi-
cate crime in order to prove an attempt to commit the predicate crime).
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argument rests on the following central premise: every unsuccessful at-
tempt is unsuccessful precisely because it was impossible for the attempt
to be successful.19 (Of course, most attemptors do not know that their
attempts are impossible; otherwise, they would not make the attempt in
the first place. Only after attempts fail do attemptors then learn that they
could not possibly have succeeded.)20 So if impossibility per se were rec-
ognized as a defense, then there would be no such thing as the crime of
attempt in the first place. Because this result is absurd—that is, because
many attempts to commit crimes are and should be recognized them-
selves as crimes—if impossibility is to be recognized as a defense, it must
be a proxy for something else, some property that not all attempts share.21
And the most likely candidate for this underlying property—that is, the
19. See Bebhinn Donnelly, Possibility, Impossibility and Extraordinariness in At-
tempts, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 47, 61 (“In mere attempts, the particular ends sought, ex
post, are always ‘impossible’ . . . .”); id. at 63–64 (2010) (“Impossibility does not dis-
tinguish the blameworthy from the not so or the less so, for it just does not distinguish
among attempts at all . . . . In the anatomy of attempts, it can be seen that there is just
nothing that normatively distinguishes most ‘impossible’ attempts from attempts gen-
erally. In all such cases, the defendant tries to secure the prohibited end, he is fully
committed to so doing and his acts are sufficiently well advanced to render him
blameworthy. The ‘peripheral’ examples of attempts, deemed to be peripheral in vir-
tue of impossibility, fall to be considered in the same way as attempts generally . . . .
[Some attempts] are often described as impossible attempts but if such, unique, ‘at-
tempts’ exist at all, then impossibility does not identify their uniqueness.”); id. at 69
(“[T]here is no paradox to be explained away for the category [of impossible at-
tempts] is just largely a myth and any distinctiveness attached to ‘impossible attempts’
is . . . normatively irrelevant.”).
20. See id. at 59–60 (“[D]efendants . . . ordinarily attempt the possible. They do
not set out to fail in their attempt to kill, they set out to succeed and, to these defend-
ants, success is possible . . .  However impossible the particular ends, and however we
learn of that impossibility, the defendant is not trying the impossible . . . .”); id. at 69
(“[P]ossibility inheres centrally in the notion of ‘attempt.’ The examples commonly
thought to fall within the category of ‘impossible attempts’ are straightforward exam-
ples of attempting the possible (It may, unusually, be the case that someone sets out
to achieve an end knowing that the end is impossible but here we may say that there is
not really an attempt to bring about the end for the actor knows it cannot be brought
about. This ‘attempt’ dissolves into self-contradiction and is not meaningfully an at-
tempt at all.).”).
21. See id. at 61 (“[I]f all attempts [are impossible] qua attempts, impossibility is
not an available characteristic for distinguishing between the criminally blameworthy
and the not so. It follows that either the hesitation [to attribute blame to some at-
tempts] is unwarranted or that reasons other than impossibility underpin it.”); id. at
64 (“The question . . . is whether some residual category of ‘attempts’ is of such a
nature that it ought not to attract liability in the same way as attempts generally do. It
happens that these attempts are often described as impossible attempts but if such,
unique, ‘attempts’ exist at all, then impossibility does not identify their uniqueness. It
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underlying property that impossible attempts, as opposed to undeniably
criminal attempts, lack—is harmfulness or dangerousness.22
The problem with Donnelly’s argument, however, is the central pre-
mise: contrary to Donnelly, impossibility explains only some, not all,
failed attempts. Some attempts fail even though they could have been
successful. Suppose, for example, I try to shoot and kill another person
but fail because my gun sight is misaligned, I neglected to correct for this
deviation, and the victim drove away before I could shoot again. It seems
false to suggest that my attempt to kill could not possibly have succeeded.
It certainly could have succeeded if I had previously corrected the sight
alignment or had (deliberately or accidentally) corrected for the devia-
tion while shooting. Many attempts, then, are possible, at least from the
outset. They fail not because they could not have succeeded but because
the agent did not try hard enough. Of course, this last point assumes that
the agent could have tried harder, a point that some determinists might
challenge.23 But we need not resolve the problem of free will and deter-
needs to be considered what, if anything, about the voodoo practitioner and the
‘jumper’ marks them as being morally different to other attempters.”).
22. See id. at 64–65 (“Usually, a defendant who goes so far as to try to achieve a
criminal end is harmful in respect of that end. Yet, it seems that harmfulness is pre-
cisely what is missing in a narrow category of extraordinary attempts . . . . [T]he de-
fendant who attempts to kill by voodoo may lack the harmfulness that is normally
present in an attempter. Both defendants intend the end and perform actions that are,
to them, more than merely preparatory; but the former at least is harmless in respect
of the end. There is no immediate potential for the harm to occur nor, usually, is there
any obvious suggestion that these sorts of defendants will try again by more effective
means . . . . [I]t appears likely . . . that in some extraordinary attempts the reasons
for failure may provide evidence of/disclose my inability to be harmful in a criminally
relevant way in the first place. Where I attempt my end by voodoo, for example, there
is something about the nature of my attempt that is relevant to an understanding of
my harmfulness and I may very well be in an analogous position to the person who
attempts to play chess by playing snakes and ladders.”).
23. See, e.g., CARL GINET, ON ACTION 106–17 (1990) (arguing that determinism is
incompatible with the ability to do otherwise); PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON
FREE WILL 2–8, 55–105 (1983) (same). Compatibilists, however, claim that determin-
ism is compatible with the ability to do otherwise; they reconcile the two by interpret-
ing the ability to do otherwise as the ability to act in accordance with one’s will, even
if the will is determined. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARI-
ETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 139 (1983) (“[W]hile there are indeed times
when we would give anything to be able to go back and undo something in the past,
we recognize that the past is closed for us, and we would gladly settle for an ‘open
future.’ But what would an open future be? A future in which our deliberation is
effective: a future in which if I decide to do A then I will do A, and if I decide to do B
then I will do B; a future in which—since only one future is possible—the only possi-
ble thing that can happen is the thing I decide in the end to do.”).
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minism in order to make the very safe assumption that many attempts fail
because of something in agents’ control such as level of effort or careful-
ness rather than something outside their control.
If we assume, contra Donnelly, that the impossibility defense makes
conceptual sense with or without any proxy for impossibility, it turns out
that there are actually four different ways to interpret it. First, the defen-
dant might be making an analytic claim: if it was impossible for me to
commit crime C, then it was impossible for me to try to commit C, in
which case I am not guilty of an attempt to commit C.
Second, she might be making a knowledge claim: if it was impossible
for me to commit C, then I must have known this fact, in which case I
could not really be trying in good faith to commit C in the first place.
Third, she might be making a consequentialist claim: if the purpose
of punishing attempt is to deter criminal activity, and if there was already
zero risk of my committing C, then there is no reason to punish my
attempt.
Fourth, she might be making a summary-judgment-type claim: even
if my attempt had been successful, I would not have broken the law. And
an attempt to do what is legal should certainly not itself be illegal.
The first (analytic) claim is weak. Even though it is impossible for
me to jump to the moon, it is still quite possible for me to try to jump to
the moon. The same, then, is true of crimes. Even if it is impossible for
me on a specific occasion to commit C, I may very well still try—and
therefore be guilty of attempt—to commit C.
The second (knowledge) claim fails for a similar reason: I can try to
jump to the moon even though I am aware that my attempt will fail.24 The
knowledge claim also fails for an additional reason: just because an at-
tempt is impossible does not mean that I must be aware of this fact. For
example, if you are not carrying a wallet, it is impossible for me to steal a
wallet from you. But I may not be aware that you are “wallet-less,” in
which case I may still genuinely try to steal your wallet.
The third (consequentialist) claim is more plausible than the first
two but still equally fails. Yes, one purpose of punishing attempts is to
minimize the risk that these attempts will be realized. As a society, we
punish attempts to murder in order to deter them. And we wish to deter
these attempts precisely because we wish to minimize murder itself—that
is, successful attempts to murder.25 But this is not the only reason that we
24. But see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. See ANTONY DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 122 (1996) (“Punishing failed at-
tempts serves . . . to deter attempts which may succeed: if failed attempts were not
punished, more people would be tempted to embark on criminal enterprises (taking
comfort in the thought that, if they failed, they would not be punished); and some
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punish attempts. A second reason for punishing attempts is that we hope
to minimize not merely the occurrence of object crimes but also the phys-
ical and psychological harms that often flow from attempts themselves.26
The fourth (summary-judgment-type) claim turns out to be the only
interpretation of the impossibility defense that works. An attempt is not
criminal only when the attempted act is not itself criminal. One cannot be
(justly) charged with attempting to break the law when the kind of act
that one is trying—and therefore intending—to commit is not illegal.27
would succeed in completing those enterprises.”); GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 22
(2010) (“[I]n threatening punishment we . . . manage to prevent some completed
crimes as well as some attempts . . . ”); Eyal Zamir, Ilana Ritov, & Doron Teichman,
Seeing Is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias, 89 IND. L.J. 195, 226 (“Criminalizing at-
tempts promotes important policy goals such as deterrence and prevention. From a
deterrence perspective, it allows punishing offenders even when they fail to complete
their plan, and thus cheaply raises the probability of punishment.”) (footnote
omitted).
26. See DUFF, supra note 25, at 120 (“The [attemptor] has, of course, still done
wrong; and though she has not brought about whatever ‘primary’ harm the crime’s
completion would involve, she might have brought about the ‘secondary’ harms in-
volved in attacking her victim and thus threatening his security.”) (footnote omitted);
id. at 125 (“Failed attempts . . . may bring about such ‘secondary’ harms as the threat
or fear of . . . a ‘primary’ harm . . . .”) (footnote omitted); id. at 130 (“If an attempt is
an attack on a legally protected interest, an attempt to commit any substantive crime
also necessarily involves secondary harm: for an interest that is attacked is normally
endangered; and even radically misguided attempts which actually threaten no pri-
mary harm can be said to involve a kind of harm by virtue of being attacks.”) (foot-
notes omitted); Anthony M. Dillof, Modal Retributivism: A Theory of Sanctions for
Attempts and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 662 (2011) (“Even in
cases of failed attempts . . . society is usually harmed to some degree. Sometimes a
would-be victim is aware of or learns of the attempt and suffers fear, anxiety, or other
psychological harm. Sometimes members of the community learn of the attempt and
suffer some sort of vicarious emotional harm or they expend resources to protect
themselves against similar crimes. Other times other persons are emboldened to act in
similar ways. These sorts of harms are secondary.”); Hasnas, supra note 2, at 72–73 R
(agreeing with Thomas Weigend “that the harm caused by the crime of attempt is the
spread of public alarm . . . . The harm of attempt cannot be the harm of the com-
pleted offense . . . . On the other hand, attempts clearly have their own harmful ef-
fects on citizens’ ability to lead peaceful and secure lives. Attempts to kill, injure, or
steal or destroy property are extremely likely to provoke violent responses when the
perpetrator is known, placing both the antagonists and innocent members of the com-
munity at risk. And when the perpetrators are not known or not apprehended, at-
tempts produce unease that causes citizens to either restrict their activities to avoid
harm or expend resources on protective measures. Attempted muggings keep people
off the streets and attempted burglaries boost home security system sales as much as
successful muggings and burglaries.”) (footnote omitted).
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
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What underlies this seemingly obvious proposition—and therefore
what underlies the only successful version of the impossibility defense—is
the principle of legality. As I explained in the Introduction, the principle
of legality says that individuals may not be punished for acts that the state
had not, at the time of the acts, designated as crimes. Respect for the
principle of legality requires the state to refrain from punishing individu-
als who attempt to perform acts that are not crimes even if these individu-
als believe that the objects of their attempts are crimes.
Suppose, for example, that I think that there is a law, the “State
Decency Act,” which prohibits the transmission of foul language on the
Internet. So, being the badass that I am, I go ahead and use the f-word
several times by email, then wait for the police to arrest me, and start
dreaming of my new life as an infamous rebel. But, alas, the police never
arrive. And even after I turn myself in, they just tell me to go home.28
Why? Because my attempt to violate the State Decency Act was an at-
tempt to break a law that did not exist. And, once again, according to
both the principle of legality and the valid version of the impossibility
defense—what is typically referred to as legal impossibility29—attempts to
break non-existent laws are not themselves criminal attempts.
III. MISTAKE OF FACT AND MISTAKE OF LAW
As I argued in Part II, the impossibility defense does have merit. In
order to fully appreciate this point, we first need to understand that the
impossibility defense is a subset of the mistake defense. There are two
kinds of mistake defense: mistake of fact and mistake of law.30
A defendant who invokes the mistake of fact defense is claiming
that, because of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact, she is really not
guilty of violating the law. And she is not guilty of violating the law be-
28. See DUFF, supra note 25, at 3 (“[A] repentant adulterer who walked into a
British police station to give herself up for this supposed crime would be told to go
home.”).
29. I will discuss legal impossibility further below in Part IV.
30. See Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Ex-
plaining and Defending the Distinction, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 213, 213 (2009) (“[T]he
fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the state’s authoritative statement
of what is prohibited ([mistake of law]), and a mistake about whether that prohibitory
norm is instantiated in a particular case ([mistake of fact])”); id. at 220 (“The funda-
mental distinction is between: (1) M Law: a mistake about what the state prohibits
(including a mistake about how state officials, including judges, authoritatively inter-
pret the prohibition); and (2) M Fact: a mistake about the instantiation of that prohib-
itory norm in a particular case, where the mistake does not flow from the first type of
mistake.”).
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cause she did not possess the required mens rea—either intent to commit,
or knowledge that she was committing, a crime.31
The mistake of fact defense is commonly invoked, for example, in
response to rape charges. A defendant charged with rape typically in-
vokes two defenses: (a) the alleged victim consented to sex or (b) in the
alternative, if she did not consent to sex, the defendant honestly and rea-
sonably believed that she was consenting. Proposition (b) is a mistake of
fact defense.32
The mistake of law defense is similar to the mistake of fact defense.
Like the mistake of fact defense, one version of the mistake of law de-
fense states that the defendant is not guilty of a crime because she did not
possess the required mens rea.33 Specifically, she did not possess the re-
31. See United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 652 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have long
espoused the proposition that a mistake of fact is less culpable than a mistake of law.
When judging criminal behavior, it is axiomatic that, although ‘ignorance of the law
will not excuse,’ a reasonable mistake of fact is less culpable because of the absence of
mens rea.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Chinasa, 789 F.Supp 2d 691, 697
(E.D. Va. 2011) (“Mistake of fact is a ‘cognizable defense negating intent when the
mens rea requirement for a crime is at least knowledge.’”) (citation omitted); People
v. Lawson, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 236, 238–39 (Ct. App. 2013) (“The mistake-of-fact de-
fense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the
crime, but applies only in limited circumstances, specifically when the defendant holds
a mistaken belief in a fact or set of circumstances which, if existent or true, would
render the defendant’s otherwise criminal conduct lawful.”); KATHRYN CHRISTOPHER
& RUSSELL CHRISTOPHER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PROBLEMS AND OUTSTANDING
ANSWERS 31 (2012) (“Under both the common law and the MPC . . . whether a mis-
take of fact provides a defense will depend on the relationship between the type of
mistake and the requisite mens rea. In general, even an unreasonable mistake will
provide a defense to an offense with an element requiring a high level of mens rea—
specific intent under the common law, and purpose or knowledge under the MPC.
But only a reasonable mistake will provide a defense, if at all, to an offense with an
element requiring a lower level of mens rea—general intent under the common law
and negligence under the MPC. And any mistake must be honest in order to supply a
defense.”).
32. See United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674, 709 n.48 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001)
(referencing “the long-standing line of cases holding that any mistake of fact regard-
ing a sexual assault victim’s consent must be honest and reasonable.”); Common-
wealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Mass. 2001) (noting that a “majority
of . . . jurisdictions” accept an honest and reasonable mistake of fact about consent as
a defense to rape); see also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE
OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 63–65, 257–60, 263–64 (1998) (discuss-
ing the difficulties with defining and evaluating the reasonableness of a man’s belief
that his female partner is consenting to sexual relations).
33. See CHRISTOPHER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 31, at 47 (“Three principal
exceptions to the general rule [denying mistake of law defenses] have emerged: (i)
reasonable reliance on an official statement of law that is afterward determined to be
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quired intent or knowledge. But the reason is different: she honestly and
reasonably believed that a specific law was otherwise. Normally, igno-
rance of the law is no excuse. But ignorance of the law can be an excuse
when the ignorance is honest and reasonable. And it is reasonable gener-
ally if, and only if, the law was either so ambiguous or so complicated that
a reasonable person could have misinterpreted it.34
For this reason, the mistake of law defense is not usually successful
in defending against malum in se crimes—that is, acts that are criminal-
ized primarily because they are morally wrong. Malum in se crimes are
considered to be so clear and obvious that citizens should and do know
about them even if they have never read the corresponding statutes. In-
stead, the mistake of law defense is generally successful only in defending
against intricate malum prohibitum crimes (for example, white collar
crimes), the correct interpretation of which tends to divide the legal
community.35
invalid or erroneous, (ii) ignorance or mistake of law that negates the mens rea of the
charged offense, and (iii) lack of fair notice.”).
34. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1957). (“Where a person did
not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of
such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process. Were it oth-
erwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is printed too fine to read or in
a language foreign to the community.”); United States v. Furey, 491 F.Supp. 1048,
1059 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[I]gnorance of the law may be an excuse where the statute
requires an act be done ‘knowingly’ . . . .”) (citations omitted); State v. Guice, 621
A.2d 553, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (“‘Implicit in these two [United States
Supreme Court] cases [Raley and Cox] is a holding that when individuals rely on an
official but erroneous representation of law they cannot be expected to know the law
is otherwise, and thus can have no notice or fair warning of what the law actually
requires or proscribes.’ It is this due process aspect of the mistake of law defense
which counterbalances the strong public policy behind the maxim ‘ignorance of the
law is no excuse.’”) (citation omitted); see also Adam L. Alter, Julia Kernochan, &
John M. Darley, Morality Influences How People Apply the Ignorance of the Law
Defense, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 819, 848 (2007) (“The official statement exception is
broadly consistent with the lay intuitions revealed in our studies, which suggest that
people should sometimes be afforded the right to present evidence to prove a claim of
legal ignorance. This doctrine is far closer to the lay intuitions identified in our studies
than the old, inflexible rule that ignorance of law never excuses. The official statement
exception reflects the view that when a defendant could not have known better, the
moral judgment inherent in criminal conviction is not an appropriate societal re-
sponse.”); Armstrong, supra note 9, at 323 (“Of course, with the ever increasing body R
of statutes and cases construing those statutes, it is now virtually impossible for every-
one truly to be on notice of whether his conduct is criminal—‘the maxim that every-
one is presumed to know the law’ is, therefore, a legal fiction.”) (footnote omitted).
35. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1164 (7th
Cir. 1997) (“[C]riminal law is more intuitive [than civil law]—and where it is not,
proof of knowledge of the illegality of the act is often required.”); United States v.
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IV. FACTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY AND LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY
How, then, does the impossibility defense relate to these two mis-
take defenses? The impossibility defense also involves mistake. But it is
important to understand which kind of mistake it involves and which kind
of mistake it does not involve. Once we achieve this level of understand-
ing, much of the conceptual mystery and complexity surrounding the im-
possibility defense disappears.
Assume the following facts:
(1) There are four 25-year-old men: Adam, Boris, Craig, and
Dante.
(2) Adam and Boris have been charged with statutory rape for
having sex with an underage minor—Amber and Blanche
respectively.
(3) Craig and Dante have been charged with attempted statutory
rape for attempting to have sex with an underage minor—
Cindy and Dolly respectively.
(4) Amber was 14 (a minor), and Adam honestly believed that
she was 19.
(5) Blanche was 19, and Boris honestly believed that she was 14
and therefore a minor.36
(6) Craig knew that Cindy was 14, and Craig honestly believed
that 14 year-olds are legal adults, not minors.
(7) Dante knew that Dolly was 19, and Dante honestly believed
that the age of majority for the purpose of giving consent to
sexual relations is 25.
Ehrlichman, 376 F.Supp. 29, 35 (D.D.C. 1974) (“[M]istake of law often is a defense to
malum prohibitum crimes requiring specific intent, such as those created by the fed-
eral tax laws.”) (citation omitted); Shao v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 100
T.C.M. (CCH) 182, 2010 WL 3377501, at *17 (Aug. 26, 2010) (“We have . . . found it
inappropriate to penalize taxpayers where a mistake of law was in a complicated sub-
ject area without clear guidance.”); City of Ontario v. Superior Court of San Bernar-
dino County, 466 P.2d 693, 700 (Cal. 1970) (“It is settled that an honest and
reasonable mistake of law on [a ‘complex and debatable’ issue] is excusable and con-
stitutes good cause for relief from default . . . ”); CHRISTOPHER & CHRISTOPHER,
supra note 31, at 47 (“[W]ith the proliferation of offenses numbering in the thousands
and the rise of malum prohibitum crimes, the hard and fast rule denying mistake of
law defenses has softened.”); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But
Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 150 (1997) (“[C]ourts permit mistake of
law as a defense . . . selectively across malum prohibitum crimes . . . .”).
36. For cases involving a similar fact pattern, see People v. Doe, 515 N.Y.S.2d 982
(Crim. Ct., 1987); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2001).
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The following chart makes it easier to see how each of these situa-
tions overlaps with, and differs from, the others:37
Underage victim No underage victim
Mistake of fact Adam. Honestly believed Boris. Honestly believed that
that Amber was 19 and Blanche was 14 and therefore
therefore that it was that it was illegal to have sex
legal to have sex with with her. But Blanche was 19.
her. But Amber was 14.
Mistake of law Craig. Knew that Cindy Dante. Knew that Dolly was
was 14 but honestly 19 but honestly believed that
believed that it was legal it was illegal to have sex with
to have sex with 14 year- 19 year-olds.
olds.
It is important to note a few things about this chart. First, there are
two different kinds of mistake of fact defense and two different kinds of
mistake of law defense. Each differs in terms of the kind of goal that they
fail to attain. On the one hand, Adam and Craig are trying not to break
the law but still end up breaking it.38 On the other hand, Boris and Dante
are trying to break the law but fail to break it.
Second, there are two kinds of impossibility defenses—factual and
legal.39 What thwarts Boris’s attempt to commit statutory rape is the ab-
sence of an external circumstance—namely, Blanche’s being over 18
years old. Blanche’s age did not cooperate; Boris thought that she was 14,
but she was really 19. Therefore it was factually impossible for Boris to
commit statutory rape. In contrast, what thwarts Dante’s attempt to com-
37. This chart has been inspired by a similar one in Simons, supra note 30, at
216–17.
38. Because statutory rape is a strict liability crime in many states, a mistake de-
fense will not work. See United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 557 (5th Cir. 2013)
(“[T]wenty-three jurisdictions characterize ‘statutory rape’ (or its equivalent) as a
strict-liability offense, whereas eighteen jurisdictions allow for a mens rea defense and
limit strict liability to situations in which there is a specific age differential between
the victim and the defendant.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Gomez-Mendez,
486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In most jurisdictions, statutory rape is a strict
liability crime.”) (citations omitted). In the other non-strict-liability states, it might
work as long as the defendant can establish to the factfinder that his mistake about his
partner’s age or the law was honest and reasonable.
39. Because this Article concerns the impossibility defense, we need not analyze
further the left column—that is, the non-impossibility mistake defenses. They are in-
cluded only to show how the impossibility defense relates to, and differs from, them.
We may now concentrate fully on the right-hand column—specifically, factual impos-
sibility and legal impossibility.
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mit statutory rape was not the absence of an external circumstance but
rather the absence of a law designating the age of majority to be over 19
years old.40 The law on statutory rape did not cooperate; Dante rightly
believed that Dolly was 19 but mistakenly thought that the law prohibited
sex with women under 25 years old. Therefore it was legally impossible
for Dante to commit statutory rape.41
When I have shown my criminal law students this chart, most of
them have the intuition that Boris is, and Dante is not, guilty of attempted
statutory rape—in other words, that only legal impossibility, not factual
impossibility, is exculpatory. As it turns out, their intuition mirrors the
common law.42 (It does not, however, mirror the relatively small amount
40. See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure
Of The “Non-Consent” Reform Movement In American Rape And Sexual Assault
Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1167 (2011) (“[U]pon reaching adult-
hood—sixteen or seventeen in most states—adolescents and young adults are free to
engage in sex with anyone, unprotected from and exposed to unwanted sex.”); Moin
A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to
Show that the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More
than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 85 n.179 (2006) (“The age of majority actually
varies from sixteen to nineteen . . . .”).
41. Larry Alexander argues that on a positivist view of the law, the distinction
between factual mistake and legal mistake (and therefore factual impossibility and
legal impossibility) breaks down. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 36–43, 52. Positivism R
suggests that there is no clear distinction between facts and laws because laws them-
selves reduce to complicated sets of facts. So to suggest that only factual, not legal,
mistakes involve getting facts wrong is both unhelpful and false. In response to Alex-
ander, I suggest that we may, for the sake of argument, accept positivism and still
distinguish between factual mistakes and legal mistakes: while legal mistakes are mis-
interpretations of cases, statutes, or other sources of law, factual mistakes are mis-
taken beliefs about anything else—that is, about anything that does not constitute a
source of law (as certified by H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of recognition”). As with every
distinction, there will inevitably be difficult borderline examples—in this case, facts
that seem to straddle the proposed divide between the pronouncements of legal
sources and all other facts. But these difficult cases should not really affect, no less
undermine, the conclusions that I draw in this Article.
42. See United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2005) (“‘Factual
impossibility is generally not a defense to criminal attempt because success is not an
essential element of attempt crimes.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Root, 296
F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The fact that Root’s crime had not ripened into a
completed offense is no obstacle to an attempt conviction. Root’s [mistaken] belief
that a minor [as opposed to an undercover officer] was involved is sufficient to sustain
an attempt conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”); United States v. Heng Awkak
Roman, 356 F.Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“‘All courts are in agreement that
what is usually referred to as ‘factual impossibility’ is no defense to a charge of at-
tempt.’”) (citations omitted); People v. Thousand, 631 N.W.2d 694, 698 (Mich. 2001)
(“It has been said that, at common law, legal impossibility is a defense to a charge of
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of post-MPC jurisprudence, which has gutted the impossibility defense.43)
How, then, might the students’ intuition—and therefore the common law
—be justified?
A. First Justification: Criminal Justice
There are three justifications. The first justification is that Dante is
not guilty because he is like a saint who strayed. He had a much higher
legal (and moral) standard for consensual sex than the rest of society.
While the law—and therefore the operative social standard—says that
women above 1844 are adult enough to have sex with 25 year-old men,
attempt, but factual impossibility is not.”); Lawhorn v. State, 898 S.W.2d 886, 891
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“Impossibility is commonly categorized as either factual or
legal. Usually applied in the context of attempt crimes, the former is not held to be a
defense, while the latter has been viewed as a valid defense.”); State v. Salerno, No.
CR 92 0080796, 1993 WL 88327, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1993) (“At common
law, a distinction is made between factual and impossibility and legal impossibility.
Usually, with respect to an attempt prosecution, the latter is a defense while the for-
mer is not.”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Henley, 474 A.2d 1115, 1116 (Pa.
1984) (“Factual impossibility has never been recognized as a defense to an attempt
charge by any American Court . . . . Legal impossibility had been recognized in
many jurisdictions as a defense to attempt charges . . . .”) (citations omitted); Booth
v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 869–70 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964) (“In this country it is generally
held that a defendant may be charged with an attempt where the crime was not com-
pleted because of ‘physical or factual impossibility’, whereas a ‘legal impossibility’ in
the completion of the crime precludes prosecution for an attempt.”) (citations omit-
ted); People v. Rollino, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (“In this country it is
generally held that a defendant may be charged with an attempt where the crime was
not completed because of ‘physical or factual impossibility’ whereas a ‘legal impossi-
bility’ in the completion of the crime precludes prosecution for an attempt.”) (cita-
tions omitted); People v. Siu, 271 P.2d 575, 576 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (“[I]f a
person formulates the intent and then proceeds to do something more which in the
usual course of natural events will result in the commission of a crime, the attempt to
commit that crime is complete. And even though the intended crime could not have
been completed, due to some extrinsic fact unknown to the person who intended it,
still he is guilty of attempt.”); FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 180 (“[M]istakes of law R
exculpate rather than inculpate; and mistakes of fact inculpate rather than excul-
pate.”) (footnote omitted). But see FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 181 (“The exemption R
for legally impossible attempts is hardly convincing. [There] are cases in which the
actor has displayed hostility toward the legal order and for that reason is as dangerous
as someone who for strictly factual reasons could not commit perjury or statutory
rape.”); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw,
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 683 n.18 (1994) (suggesting that some scholars
and courts have been under the impression that factual impossibility is just as exculpa-
tory as legal impossibility).
43. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Dante thought that the age of majority was higher. So when he tried to
have sex with Dolly, the law that he was trying to break was not the ac-
tual law. Rather, the law that he was trying to break involved a higher
standard than the actual law. One might fault Dante for straying from his
higher standard. But that is not a crime any more than violating our own
high standards for altruism or kindness are crimes.
Criminal law—at least just criminal law—does not penalize personal
moral failings. It does not require us all to be saints or even to remain
true to our less-than-saintly codes. Unlike virtue ethics,45 it does not set
an aspirational bar that we are all required to reach. Indeed, if it did,
most of us would end up in jail. Rather, it establishes only a lower bar, a
basement level of conduct that everybody is required to stay above. If
they satisfy this minimum threshold, they stay out of trouble. But if they
fall below this minimum threshold, then they are considered to be even
worse than the rest of us sinners—at least the vast majority of the public
who manage to stay above it (or not get caught for straying below it).46
All of this explains not only why Dante is not guilty but also why
Boris is guilty. Once again, Dante did not fall beneath society’s minimum
threshold when he tried to have sex with Dolly. Instead, he fell beneath
only what was in his own head—a legal standard (far) surpassing soci-
ety’s. So while he might scold or punish himself for his self-transgression,
45. See K. Craig Welkener, Possible But Not Easy: Living the Virtues and Defend-
ing the Guilty, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1085–86 (2013) (“Instead of seeking to
formulate a rule or set of rules that determine the morality of action, virtue ethics
focuses on the character of the actor to determine the morality of action, emphasizing
vice and virtue. Virtue ethicists ask different questions than a deontologist or a conse-
quentialist, such as: how can an attorney be faithful to his client, and also honest?
What do justice and integrity require? . . . [V]irtue ethics brings a new perspective to
old questions. Because virtue ethics as theory has only become prominent somewhat
recently, applied virtue ethics is a very small field, and there has not been a significant
application of virtue ethics specifically to criminal defense of the guilty.”) (footnotes
omitted).
46. See Ken Levy, Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place
of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 630, 671 (2014)
(“[T]he criminal justice system does not hold us to an impossibly high standard. The
criminal justice system does not require us all to be saints. If it did, then most of us
would be in jail. Instead, the criminal justice system does just the opposite. It estab-
lishes a floor, not a ceiling. It tells individuals within its jurisdiction the minimum that
they cannot drop below, not a threshold that they must rise above. We are all free to
be jerks; we just cannot be supreme jerks. That is, we are all free to do such morally
wrong things as lie to friends, send angry emails, and ‘flip the bird’ at other drivers.
We will not go to jail for these acts even though they fall below a proper standard of
virtue. But we will go to jail if we injure or attempt to injure others in much more
serious ways—ways that fall below a minimum standard of care that we owe every-
body else.”).
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society would not have the right to do the same. Boris, on the other hand,
is guilty of attempt even though it was (factually) impossible for him to
commit the object crime (statutory rape) on that particular occasion be-
cause he attempted to descend below the minimum threshold for legal
conduct. As the Tenth Circuit stated, “[I]t is not a defense to an offense
involving . . . exploitation of minors that the defendant falsely believed a
minor to be involved.”47
B. Second Justification: Dangerousness
The second justification for our intuition that only Boris, not Dante,
is guilty is that Boris is more dangerous than Dante.48 Yes, it is true that
neither of them had sex with an underage girl. Indeed, not only did they
not commit the object crime; it was impossible for them to commit the
object crime. While Boris was trying to have sex with a person whom he
believed to be 14 years old, he just could not make it happen on this
particular occasion because Blanche was 19 years old. Likewise, while
Dante was trying to break the law—that is, what he understood to be the
law—he just could not make it happen on this particular occasion be-
cause Dolly was 19 and therefore above the actual age of majority. The
difference, however, is this: given Boris’s and Dante’s behavior in these
situations, we may infer that Boris is much more likely to commit statu-
tory rape than Dante.49
If Boris is trying to have sex with a person whom he believes to be
14 years old on this particular occasion, he has demonstrated a propensity
that is likely to be realized sooner or later. This fact alone makes Boris a
very dangerous man. We cannot, however, say the same about Dante.
47. United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 960 (10th Cir. 2005). See also Kadish,
supra note 42, at 688 (“Do the hunters who shot the dummy believing it was a deer, or
Professor Moriarty, who shot the shadow thinking it was Sherlock Holmes, deserve
no punishment because they were mistaken?”).
48. See FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 172 (“Virtually all the proponents of subjectiv- R
ity in the law of attempts stress the value of their approach in identifying and convict-
ing dangerous persons. The typical argument is: If the ultimate test is the
dangerousness of the actor, then there is no point to exempting inapt attempts from
liability. A man who shoots at a tree stump might well be just as dangerous as some-
one who shoots at his intended victim’s bed. So, if the ultimate test is indeed danger-
ousness, the subjectivists are right.”) (footnote omitted); Kadish, supra note 42, at 685
(arguing that people who commit impossible attempts are just as dangerous as people
who commit successful attempts and therefore should be punished equally). But see
Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
523, 542–43 (2008) (arguing that the dangerousness rationale “falls short”).
49. Cf. Westen, supra note 48, at 546 (framing this justification not in terms of the
future threat that attemptors pose but rather the threat that attemptors posed at the
time that they made the attempt).
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The most we can infer about him from the current situation with Dolly is
that he will continue to try to have sex with women around the age of 19
years old and will think each time that he is breaking the law. But nothing
about this propensity is actually dangerous, even if Dante believes that it
is.
One might argue that Dante is dangerous as evidenced by the fact
that he is willing to break what he believes to be the law. But this point is
false. There must be evidence that Dante intended to break not merely an
imagined law but rather the actual law. In case the reader is in doubt,
compare two people who know more or less about laws prohibiting use of
firearms against other individuals without justification. One tries to vio-
late these laws with a water pistol, the other with an assault rifle. Only the
latter is dangerous; the former is not—at least not until he manifests an
intent to fire something much more potent than a water pistol.
C. Third Justification: Malum in Se
The third justification for our intuition that Boris is guilty and Dante
is not is that only Boris’s action is malum in se. Engaging in sexual rela-
tions with a 14 year-old is not merely legally wrong but also morally
wrong. It is morally wrong because a 14 year-old, no matter how intelli-
gent and mature, is very likely going to be physically and psychologically
harmed by sexual relations. He/she is simply not ready for this kind of
intimate contact with another human being.50 As he/she gets older, the
potential harm from sexual relations becomes less until she reaches the
age of majority, at which point it is assumed that, abnormal physical or
psychological limitations aside, he/she can give sufficiently rational con-
50. See United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e
[have] held that consensual sexual contact with a minor under 14 necessarily in-
volve[s] psychological abuse because a child that young cannot understand the nature
of an adult’s sexual advances.”) (footnote omitted); C.D.B. v. State, 81 So.3d 399, 409
(Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (“Certainly very young children do not understand the ramifi-
cations of sexual activity but can be emotionally scarred for life when victimized . . . .
I believe that child victims of young and tender years do not understand the nature
and consequences of sexual relations . . . .”); State v. J.A.S., 686 So.2d 1366, 1369 n.2
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[O]ne under 16 . . . is supposed to be protected from the
sexual advances of others because of his or her age and inability to fully consent to
sex.”); Andrea Erwin Potter, Sexting and Louisiana’s Punishment for the Children the
Law Intends to Protect from Prosecution Under Child Pornography Statutes, 45 FAM.
L.Q. 419, 427–28 (2011) (“[M]inors lack the maturity to understand sexual behavior
especially resulting from coercion by adults.”).
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sent to sexual relations without necessarily suffering any physical or psy-
chological harm.51
Boris was trying to have sex with a person whom he believed to be
at an age that society regards as incapable of consent. This act, this aiming
to do something malum in se, is itself malum in se—just slightly less than
statutory rape because it is arguably worse to commit the object crime
itself than to try to commit the object crime.52 Therefore, given his mens
rea (plus the actus reus required for attempt), he is guilty of attempted
statutory rape.
Dante’s act, on the other hand, was not malum in se—except in his
own head. He was trying to have sex with a person who, contrary to his
belief, was legally capable of consent. Had he realized his goal, Dolly
would not have been harmed. (At least he was legally entitled to this
presumption.) What he was trying to do—have sex with Dolly—was not
only not malum in se but not even malum prohibitum. Therefore his act—
his trying—was not malum in se or malum prohibitum either.
D. Conclusion: Legal Impossibility Is a Valid Defense
Putting the three arguments above together, we may conclude that
only legal impossibility, not factual impossibility, is a successful defense.53
On the one hand, if there is a law prohibiting what I am trying to do, then
even if I could not have broken this law on a particular occasion because
external facts were not cooperating, I am still guilty of trying to break the
law. Factual impossibility will not exonerate me. Perhaps the clearest ex-
ample of this point is the failed pickpocketer, which I mentioned in the
Introduction. As long as there is a law against what I am trying to do—in
this case, a law against theft—my attempt to break this law is against the
51. See State v. Zeh, 1986 WL 4787 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (“The law does not
prohibit any and all sexual conduct between adults who are ready, willing and
able . . . ”); Steve James, Comment, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analy-
sis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 244 (2009)
(“In the context of sex, ‘[t]he age of consent is the age at which a young person is
legally able to understand and agree to consensual sex.’”) (citation omitted).
52. Cf. Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common
Link Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1056
(2007) (“On the one hand, if a particular threat is sufficiently dangerous or wrong to
be criminalized, then surely the threatened action—which is arguably even more dan-
gerous and therefore more wrong than the threat—should be criminalized as well. On
the other hand, if a particular action is not sufficiently dangerous or wrong to be
criminalized, then surely the threat of such an action—which is arguably even less
dangerous and therefore less wrong than the threatened action itself—should not be
criminalized either.”) (footnotes omitted).
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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law as well. It does not matter if my particular attempt under the circum-
stances could not have been successful. On the other hand, if there is no
law prohibiting what I am trying to do, then—even if I think there is—
there is nothing to charge me with. I cannot justly be charged with trying
to break a non-existing law. So unlike factual impossibility, legal impossi-
bility does qualify as a legitimate defense.
V. THREE REASONS FOR CONFUSION
Given Part IV, I conclude that there are several good reasons for
thinking that legal impossibility is exculpatory. The law should continue
to excuse defendants who are charged with attempt and properly plead
legal impossibility. To deprive them of this defense simply because the
legal establishment cannot resolve the complexities surrounding the fac-
tual-impossibility/legal-impossibility distinction, complexities that I just
clarified in Part IV, is entirely unjust.
Still, in order for my proposal to advance, we must first understand
why the legal establishment has tied itself into such embarrassing knots of
confusion about the impossibility defense in the first place. In this Part, I
will offer three explanations. My ultimate goal is to show that (a) the
impossibility defense is not at all hopelessly confused, therefore (b) the
legal-impossibility version of the impossibility defense is still viable, and
therefore (c) courts should once again recognize it.
A. The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code (MPC) adopts a “subjectivist” approach.54 It
suggests that what matters for attempt is what is in the person’s head—
the person’s beliefs and intent—rather than the likelihood of success:
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of
the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct that would consti-
tute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes
them to be . . . .55
54. See Rogers, supra note 2, at 342 (“[S]ubjectivists focus on the actor’s intent— R
if he intends to commit a crime he is dangerous and should be punished, even if he
fails. His actions merely confirm his intent. Subjectivist theory tends to expand culpa-
bility because the defendant’s bad intent governs.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 346
(“[T]he Model Penal Code recommended a rejection of an objectivist approach in
favor of a subjectivist viewpoint.”) (footnote omitted).
55. MODEL PENAL CODE §5.01 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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If, for example, Person A reaches into Person B’s pocket with the intent
of stealing the latter’s wallet, this intent plus the actus reus of reaching is
sufficient for attempted theft. It does not matter whether Person B’s
pocket actually contained a wallet and therefore how likely it was that
Person A would succeed.56
This subjectivist approach to attempt was largely calculated to abol-
ish the impossibility defense altogether:
Subsection (1) is . . . designed to reject the defense of impossibil-
ity . . . It does so . . . by providing that the defendant’s conduct
should be measured according to the circumstances as he believes
them to be, rather than the circumstances as they may have ex-
isted in fact.57
56. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008) (“As with other incho-
ate crimes—attempt and conspiracy, for example—impossibility of completing the
crime because the facts were not as the defendant believed is not a defense. ‘All
courts are in agreement that what is usually referred to as ‘factual impossibility’ is no
defense to a charge of attempt.’”) (citations omitted); People v. Siu, 271 P.2d 575, 576
(“[I]f a person formulates the intent and then proceeds to do something more which
in the usual course of natural events will result in the commission of a crime, the
attempt to commit that crime is complete. And even though the intended crime could
not have been completed, due to some extrinsic fact unknown to the person who
intended it, still he is guilty of attempt.”); FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 169 (“[T]he R
prestigious Model Penal Code adopted the subjectivist principle that liability should
depend on the circumstances as the actor ‘believes them to be.’”) (footnote and cita-
tion omitted); Stephen P. Garvey, Are Attempts Like Treason?, 14 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 173, 195–96 (2011) (“[S]ubjectivists and objectivists rightly disagree about im-
possibility. Objectivists insist on an impossibility defense for those actors who cross
the line into attempt but nonetheless fail to cause the reasonable person to believe
that an unjustifiable risk of harm is in the air. Subjectivists see things differently. If the
actor made the choice to do that which he believes will cause or unjustifiably risk
harm, then the fact that it turns out that the attempt was impossible is neither here
nor there. Choice is what matters, and the impossible attempter has made the choice
subjectivists say he should not have made. If it turns out that the world refuses to be
an accomplice in his plans, so what?”) (footnote omitted).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); see
also People v. Rollino, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580, 588–89 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (“Tentative Draft
No. 10 of the Model Penal Code (p. 25) makes obvious the reason and necessity for
the adoption of the proposed Article 5.01 when it says: ‘ . . . It should suffice, there-
fore, to indicate at this stage what we deem to be the major results of the draft. They
are: ‘(a) to extend the criminality of attempts by sweeping aside the defense of impos-
sibility (including the distinction between so-called factual and legal impossibility)
and by drawing the line between attempt and non-criminal preparation further away
from the final act; the crime becomes essentially one of criminal purpose imple-
mented by an overt act strongly corroborative of such purpose . . . .’”).
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In other words, by relocating the essence of attempt from the external
world to the actor’s head, the external world was rendered mostly irrele-
vant to attempt liability. So even if the actor was simply unlucky and the
external world made her intent impossible to realize, she could still be
said to have attempted the crime and therefore to be guilty of attempt.
Impossibility—the external world’s failure to cooperate—no longer helps
to exonerate her.
The subjectivist approach to attempt is plausible. But contrary to the
quotation above from the MPC Commentaries, the invalidity of the im-
possibility defense does not follow from MPC §5.01. Like factual impossi-
bility, legal impossibility equally involves trying—intending—to break
the law. So by MPC §5.01, which focuses on what is in the person’s head
rather than in her environment, legal impossibility should be just as inva-
lid a defense as factual impossibility.58 But it isn’t; this conclusion sweeps
too broadly. Even though legal impossibility also involves an intent to
break the law, it still remains a valid defense simply because the law that
the person intends to break does not exist. Given the principle of legality,
we cannot justly convict and punish a person who did everything she
could to violate a law that is nothing more than a figment of her imagina-
tion. So to the extent that the MPC is thought to entail that people who
try to break non-existent laws are just as guilty of attempt as people who
try to break existing laws (but fail because of an external circumstance),
the MPC is mistaken. The MPC should instead have distinguished be-
tween two kinds of subjective impossibility: inculpatory factual impossi-
bility and exculpatory legal impossibility.
B. Factual and Legal Impossibility
The second reason for so much confusion about the impossibility
defense is that courts and scholars consistently misuse terms. What many
of them refer to as legal impossibility is actually factual impossibility.59 It
58. See FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 175 (“The consensus in Western legal systems R
is that there ought to be an exemption from punishment for attempts . . . in
cases . . . of legal impossibility . . . Yet within the framework of the [Model Penal
Code’s] subjective standard that the facts should be taken as the actor perceives them
to be, it is by no means easy to explain why . . . legally impossible attempts should be
exempt from punishment . . . . In the case in which [the actor] takes his lying to a
police officer to be a case of perjury, he believes that he is violating the law, and
therefore he should be held accountable as though he were.”) (footnotes omitted);
FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 180 (“The . . . extreme concern about dangerous hostility R
to the legal order should lead to the punishability of those who think that they are
committing offenses when they are not.”).
59. Some cases and scholarship that confuse the two concepts include: United
States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998); State v. Condon, 919 A.2d 178, 183
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is a mistake to conflate factual impossibility with legal impossibility, and
it is a double mistake to conclude from this conflation that legal impossi-
bility is no more exculpatory than factual impossibility.
Consider one of the earliest and most famous impossibility cases,
People v. Jaffe.60 While Jaffe believed that he was committing the crime of
receiving stolen property, he was mistaken because the property was not
in fact stolen.61 But the question remained: was Jaffe guilty of attempting
to receive stolen property? The Jaffe court said no on the grounds that it
was legally impossible for Jaffe to receive stolen property.62 And it was
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); State v. Taylor, 810 A.2d 964, 970 (Md. 2002); Peo-
ple v. Thousand, 614 N.W.2d at 676; State v. Salerno, No. CR 92 0080796, 1993 WL
88327, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1993); People v. Cecil, 179 Cal.Rptr. 736, 739
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725, 733 (1977) (suggesting that
two factual-impossibility cases, Guffey and Taylor, were legal-impossibility cases);
Pazuniak, supra note 5, at 700 n.51 (mistakenly claiming that the court in United
States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 n.20 (2d Cir. 2006) summarized “circuit court deci-
sions rejecting the legal impossibility defense in § 2422(b) cases” when the Brand
court in fact summarized circuit court decisions rejecting the factual legal impossibility
defense in § 2422(b) cases). See also Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1964) (“What is a ‘legal impossibility’ as distinguished from a ‘physical or factual
impossibility’ has over a long period of time perplexed our courts and has resulted in
many irreconcilable decisions and much philosophical discussion by legal scholars in
numerous articles and papers in law school publications and by text writers.”); State v.
Taylor, 133 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1939); FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 177–78 (listing R
examples that are difficult to identify as factual impossibility or legal impossibility
because they seem to involve elements of both); Rogers, supra note 2, at 324 (mistak- R
enly suggesting that the Jaffe case involved legal impossibility); Simons, supra note 30,
at 217 n.4 (“Confusingly, many courts employ the term ‘legal’ impossibility for a much
broader category of cases, many of which involve only [mistakes of fact].”); Wagner,
supra note 2, at 1066 (“[T]he impossibility defense is often applied inconsistently, at R
times because the distinction between factual and legal impossibility becomes un-
workable in practice.”).
60. 185 N.Y. 497 (1906).
61. See id. at 500.
62. See id. at 500 (“The crucial distinction between the case before us and the
pickpocket cases, and others involving the same principle, lies . . . in the fact that, in
the present case, the act, which it was doubtless the intent of the defendant to commit
would not have been a crime if it had been consummated.”). The Jaffe court also
claimed that it is impossible to attempt to commit a crime that is itself impossible to
commit: “It is . . . difficult to perceive how there can be an attempt to receive stolen
goods . . . when they have not been stolen in fact.” Id. at 500. This inference is falla-
cious for the same reason that I gave in Part II: just because it is impossible to jump to
the moon does not mean that it is impossible to attempt to jump to the moon. See also
Booth, 398 P.2d at 871–72 (fallaciously reasoning that because the object crime,
knowingly receiving stolen property, could not be achieved, the defendants could not
have attempted to commit this crime).
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legally impossible because the property in question did not bear the legal
status of being stolen.
This reasoning, however, was fallacious. Jaffe should have been
found guilty of attempting to receive stolen property. He was much more
like Boris than Dante; he failed to commit the crime of receiving stolen
property because his attempt was foiled by an absent circumstance—the
property of not being stolen—rather than by the absence of a law against
receiving stolen property.63
As it turns out, Jaffe is hardly the only case to confuse factual impos-
sibility and legal impossibility. Just consider this list in Lawhorn:
Cited examples of legal impossibility include attempt to receive
stolen property that was not stolen, attempt to murder a
corpse . . . attempt to bribe a public official for purposes of secur-
ing a particular vote when the official had no authority to vote on
the matter, attempt to bribe a person believed to be a juror when
that person is not actually a juror.64
All of these supposed examples of legal impossibility are really examples
of factual impossibility. They all involve a mistake of fact about another
person and therefore factual impossibility rather than a mistake of law
(notably, a belief in a non-existent law) and therefore legal impossibility.
Once again, factual impossibility involves a person doing everything
she could to commit a crime and failing because an external fact did not
cooperate. On the other hand, legal impossibility involves a person doing
everything she could to commit a crime and failing because the law did
not cooperate. In the former case, the defendant would have committed
the crime had just one external circumstance been different. In the latter
case, the defendant would have committed the crime had another very
different kind of external circumstance—namely, the legal status of the
object of the agent’s attempt—been different.
The main reason why courts like Jaffe have confused factual impos-
sibility and legal impossibility is because they amount to the same thing at
a very general level of description: both involve a person’s doing every-
63. See Commonwealth v. Henley, 474 A.2d 1115, 1116–17 (Pa. 1984) (“The rea-
soning in the Jaffe line of cases has come under considerable criticism in the last
twenty-five years, and in response to the criticism the defense has been uniformly
rejected by the highest courts of most states where the issue has been raised. Addi-
tionally, many states have passed legislation which specifically abrogated the defense.
The suggested abrogation of the impossibility defense through legislation was first
introduced to most state legislatures via the Model Penal Code.”) (footnotes
omitted).
64. Lawhorn v. State, 898 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing JEROME
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 595 (2nd ed. 1960)).
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thing she could to commit a crime and failing because of an external fact.
At a more specific level of description, however, this identity disappears,65
and it is this divergence that too many courts have overlooked.
C. Hybrid Impossibility
The third reason for so much confusion about the impossibility de-
fense is closely related to the second: courts and scholars have mistaken
straightforward factual impossibility cases for “mixed” or “hybrid” im-
possibility cases—that is, cases that equally involve both factual impossi-
bility and legal impossibility and therefore make the question of the
defendant’s guilt a matter of arbitrary choice.66
Consider one of the earliest and most glaring examples: State v. Guf-
fey.67 In Guffey, Judge Vandeventer reversed the conviction of defendants
for attempting to hunt a deer out of season because the target of their
shot was a “dummy” deer.68 Judge Vandeventer argued that the defend-
ants were eligible for the impossibility defense because their mistake—
and therefore the nature of the impossibility—was legal rather than fac-
tual.69 While they thought that they were shooting a real deer out of sea-
son and therefore breaking the law, they were in fact shooting a fake
deer, which was, at that time, not against the law. In terms of the chart in
Part IV above, Judge Vandeventer thought that the defendants were
much more like Dante than Boris—that is, guilty more of a legal mistake
than of a factual mistake—and therefore not guilty on the basis of a
strong legal impossibility claim rather than guilty on the basis of a weak
factual impossibility claim.
Judge Vandeventer’s reasoning, however, was fallacious. Even if it
was not illegal to shoot fake deer, it was illegal to shoot real deer. It was
this law, not any law about fake deer, that the defendants were trying to
break. So this was not at all a case of legal impossibility. Instead, because
they well understood the law prohibiting hunting out of season and mis-
takenly thought that they were shooting a real deer, this was purely a case
of factual mistake and therefore factual impossibility—that is, trying to
kill a real deer but failing because of a factual mistake that rendered it
65. If the external fact is the absence of an applicable law, then the situation is
legal impossibility. If the external fact is a circumstance that thwarts the object crime,
then the situation is factual impossibility.
66. Hasnas, supra note 2, at 5 (“[W]hether an attempt is legally or factually im- R
possible appears to depend more on the way the court chooses to characterize the
defendant’s actions than on the defendant’s actions themselves.”).
67. 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
68. See id. at 156.
69. See id. at 156.
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impossible for their goal to be realized. And because factual impossibility
is not a viable defense—again, Boris rather than Dante—it follows that
the defendants should have been convicted of attempting to hunt a deer
out of season.
Some have gone so far as to claim that all impossibility cases can be
characterized as involving both factual impossibility and legal impossibil-
ity and therefore that all impossibility cases involve hybrid impossibility.70
I argue, however, that just the opposite is true: there is no such thing as
hybrid impossibility.71 If I am correct, then Guffey and every other deci-
sion that claims to be dealing with hybrid impossibility is deeply flawed.
Whenever there is both an attempt to break the law and a hybrid
mistake—that is, a legal mistake that derives from a factual mistake—the
impossibility resulting from this hybrid mistake will still fall clearly into
either the factual-impossibility (Boris) category or the legal-impossibility
(Dante) category. The person will be unable to break the law either be-
cause (a) she does not correctly understand the content or scope of the
actually existing (and relevant) law or (b) she is blocked by at least one
fact outside her control other than the content or scope of the law. Situa-
tion (a) is legal impossibility; situation (b) is factual impossibility.
One might try to come up with an example in which both (a) and (b)
are satisfied. But any such example will still fall clearly into only one of
the two categories. To prove my point, I offer two examples:
Example #1. Marksman reads a recent homicide case from her ju-
risdiction, accidentally overlooks a few key words, and—as a re-
sult of her sloppy reading—mistakenly believes that the case, and
therefore law, categorically prohibits killing in self-defense. The
70. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he distinction be-
tween factual and legal impossibility is essentially a matter of semantics, for every
case of legal impossibility can reasonably be characterized as a factual impossibil-
ity.”); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964) (“Detailed discussion
of the subject is unnecessary to make it clear that it is frequently most difficult to
compartmentalize a particular set of facts as coming within one of the categories
rather than the other.”); Westen, supra note 48, at 534 (“[E]very impossibility case is
both an instance of factual impossibility and legal impossibility, depending upon how
it is characterized. Thus, instead of describing [an] attempted poaching as a legal im-
possibility and [an] attempted pick pocketing as factual impossibility, [a court could
say] the opposite. It could . . . describ[e] the former as factual impossibility and the
latter as legal impossibility.”)
71. Cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpa-
bility: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 470–71 (1990) (re-
jecting the notion that there is “an ‘intermediate’ category between law and fact” or a
category “of ‘mixed’ questions of fact and law” that threatens the distinction between
mistake of fact and mistake of law).
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next day, Mugger accosts Marksman and points a gun in Marks-
man’s face. Instantly, Marksman draws her own gun, which she
was legally carrying; points it at Mugger’s head; and pulls the trig-
ger. But no bullets come out because Marksman had forgotten to
load them. Mugger then runs away. Was Marksman’s attempt to
break the law legally impossible or factually impossible?
The answer is that it was legally impossible because Marksman funda-
mentally misunderstood the law of self-defense. Yes, she made a factual
mistake—overlooking some words—while reading the homicide case.
But it was not this factual mistake that made her attempt to break the law
impossible. (Nor was it the fact that she had forgotten to load the gun,
another factual mistake.) Rather, what made her attempt to break the
law impossible was simply the fact that, whatever she may have thought
about it, the law does not prohibit killing in justified self-defense in the
first place.
What if the person makes a hybrid mistake—again, a legal mistake
that derives from a factual mistake—but, contrary to Example #1, her
legal mistake amounts only to a misapplication, not a content or scope
misunderstanding, of the law? Consider the following hypothetical—Ex-
ample #2—from Larry Alexander:
The hunting season begins October 15 according to a fish and
game regulation. There is a penal statute prohibiting hunting ex-
cept during hunting season . . .
. . .
. . . [T]he regulations, instead of giving the date of the hunting
season, state that hunting is allowed on any day that a green flag is
displayed at the Fish and Game Department office, but not on any
day when a red flag is displayed there. Mr. Fact/Law, who is color-
blind, sees the green flag but thinks it is red. He goes hunting,
believing he is hunting out of season.72
Mr. Fact/Law clearly makes two kinds of mistake—factual and legal. Mr.
Fact/Law’s factual mistake is a misperception of the flag’s color; it is
green, but because of his colorblindness, he perceives it as red. Mr. Fact/
Law’s legal mistake is a resulting misinterpretation of his misperception;
he believes hunting is forbidden (because he mistakenly perceives the
flag to be red) when it is actually legal (because the flag is actually green).
Mr. Fact/Law, then, is making a hybrid mistake–that is, a mistake of law
that derives from a mistake of fact.
72. Alexander, supra note 8, at 50 (citing Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. R
Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes (1989)).
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It does not follow, however, that there is any hybrid impossibility.
Instead, this situation is clearly one of factual impossibility. Mr. Fact/Law
is like Boris, not Dante. Once again, Boris tried to violate the statutory
rape law, a law that actually exists and which he correctly understood, but
failed because he made a factual mistake—underestimating his partner’s
age. Likewise, Mr. Fact/Law tried to violate the law forbidding hunting
out of season, a law that actually exists and which he correctly under-
stood, but failed because he also made a factual mistake—again, mis-
perceiving the flag to be red instead of green.
Put another way, both Boris and Mr. Fact/Law tried to break the law
but failed not because they misunderstood the law—they both under-
stood it perfectly well—but because they misapplied the law. And they
misapplied the law not because of a legal mistake—again, they under-
stood the law perfectly well—but because of a factual mistake. Had they
both been right about the facts—respectively, Blanche’s age and the flag’s
being green—they would have known that their attempts, if successful,
would not have violated the law. And that is what separates both Boris
and Mr. Fact/Law from Dante. Dante did know Dolly’s age, but he still
thought that he was breaking the law. Why? Because he completely mis-
understood its scope. Again, he thought that the statutory rape law pro-
tected everybody under 25 when it protected only everybody under 18.
I conclude that hybrid impossibility—impossibility that falls equally
into both the factual-impossibility and legal-impossibility categories—just
does not exist. So the courts that claim that situations involving solicita-
tion of an undercover officer to commit a crime—for example, a drug or
sex crime—involve hybrid impossibility and therefore that the defendants
might not be guilty are simply mistaken. These cases do not involve any
legal impossibility or therefore any hybrid impossibility; they involve only
factual impossibility. The defendants in these cases are not attempting to
break laws that do not exist or that they do not understand. They are
attempting to break laws that do exist and that they do understand. Yes,
these cases involve hybrid mistakes—the factual mistake of thinking that
the undercover officer is a good-faith collaborator and the resulting legal
mistake that the supposed collaborator is not legally authorized to en-
force the law. But, once again, hybrid mistakes do not entail hybrid im-
possibility. Indeed, it is the failure to recognize this point that explains
why so many courts and scholars have perceived hybrid impossibility
where it simply does not exist.
Likewise, as long as we are discussing non-entailment, it is impor-
tant to remember that a legal mistake does not necessarily entail legal
impossibility. Recall Craig from the chart in Part IV. Craig had sex with
Cindy, knew that Cindy was 14, and honestly believed that it was legal to
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have sex with 14 year-olds. Craig, then, made a legal mistake. But there
was no impossibility involved; he succeeded in having sex with a minor.
This is one of the two main distinctions between Craig and Dante, who
failed to have sex with a minor.73
VI. WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE RESURRECT
THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFENSE?
The central thesis of this Article is that we should resurrect the le-
gal-impossibility version of the impossibility defense. Against this thesis,
however, one might raise two objections. The first objection is that most,
if not all, courts already recognize legal impossibility.74 The second objec-
tion is that legal-impossibility cases are much rarer than factual-impossi-
bility cases.75 In the remainder of this Part, I will argue that both
objections are dubious.
A. Two Kinds of Legal Impossibility
In response to the first objection—again, the objection that legal
impossibility is already recognized in most, if not all, jurisdictions—I offer
two responses. First, the evidence points in the very opposite direction.
The fact of the matter is that most jurisdictions have abolished the legal-
impossibility version of the impossibility defense.76
Second, even if some courts still (tacitly) accept the legal-impossibil-
ity version of the impossibility defense, mere acceptance is not sufficient.
The legality principle—again, a foundational principle of criminal justice
which says that people may be punished only for acts that are explicitly
prohibited at the time that they perform these acts77—calls for official
statutory recognition of the impossibility defense. Otherwise, defendants
who have a solid legal-impossibility defense remain vulnerable to the
whims, prejudices, and ignorance of various players in the criminal justice
73. The second distinction involves their different beliefs about the law. While
Craig believed that the age of majority (for the purpose of giving consent to sexual
relations) falls below 14 years old, Dante believed that the age of majority (for the
purpose of giving consent to sexual relations) is 25 years old.
74. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199 n.16 (“Pure legal impossibility is always a defense”);
Rogers, supra note 6, at 495 (claiming that “[p]ure legal impossibility is a defense in
all jurisdictions.”) (footnote omitted).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We need
not hold that there can never be a case of true legal impossibility, although such a case
would be rare.”); DUFF, supra note 25, at 93 (“Cases of purely imaginary crime are
unlikely to come to court . . . .”).
76. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
77. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. R
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system. In fact, defendants remain especially vulnerable to jurors who (a)
believe that there should have been a law prohibiting the defendant’s
(despicable) act and (b) are aware that the defendant herself mistakenly
believed that there was just such a law. Too many jurors will be all too
tempted to convict the defendant on the basis of (a) and (b) simply by
pretending that a certain law, real or fictional, prohibits these acts. It is
precisely this temptation against which the legality principle has been
erected.78
Lest one think that this situation—a situation in which a person is
arrested, tried, and punished for committing an act that was not explicitly
prohibited—is farfetched, just the opposite is true.79 Many defendants
have been, or are, in this unfortunate situation. There are two facts in
support of this generalization, one simple, the other more complicated.
The simple reason is that history is full of examples.80 Just because the
legality principle is foundational does not mean that it is always
respected.
The more complicated reason requires us to distinguish between
two different kinds of legal impossibility. According to the first kind of
legal impossibility, there is no law even close to what the individual
imagines. According to the second kind of legal impossibility, there is a
law close enough to what the individual imagines, but there is still an
78. Cf. Hasnas, supra note 2, at 62 (“[W]hether a defendant’s conduct looks like R
an attempt is highly relevant to the question of whether the effort to punish it will
create too great a risk of enforcement error or abuse. Empowering state enforcement
agents to punish those whose conduct is indistinguishable from that of innocent citi-
zens solely because of what is in their minds provides the enforcement agents with
more power and temptation to interfere with the liberty of citizens than can be justi-
fied by the added security that would be achieved. Thus, the common law impossibil-
ity defense is normatively justified not because the defendants who utilize it do not
deserve punishment, but because it is necessary to protect law-abiding citizens from
the risk of enforcement error and abuse.”); id. at 68–69 (“Requiring the prosecution
to establish an element beyond merely what the defendant was thinking reduces the
opportunity and the temptation for state enforcement agents to bring unfounded
charges of attempt for ulterior reasons, thereby reducing the risk of enforcement
abuse. It also decreases the likelihood that charges will be mistakenly brought on the
basis of false or ambiguous information regarding the defendant’s state of mind, e.g.,
on the basis of informer testimony, thereby reducing the risk of enforcement error.”).
79. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER CAROL S. STEIKER, &
RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
162 (9th ed. 2012) (“[C]ourts create new crimes, not within the ambit of any existing
statute, to reach situations that are considered analogous to ones already covered.
The doctrine of criminal law by analogy is often associated with totalitarian regimes,
but . . . it is not unknown to the common law.”).
80. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
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unrealistic distance between the kinds of acts that this law prohibits and
the act by which the individual attempts to violate it. This mistaken appli-
cation of the law—that is, thinking that an actually existing law prohibits
a particular act when it simply does not—amounts to legal rather than
factual impossibility because, ex hypothesi, the mistake is about the scope
of the law rather than about the nature of the act being performed or
some contingency in the external world.
Consider again the individual who thinks that sticking his tongue
out at people is illegal.81 Call this person Sam. Sam falls into the first
category of legal impossibility if he believes that there is a distinct Anti-
Tongue-Sticking-Out statute. Sam falls into the second category of legal
impossibility if he believes that this insulting gesture with his tongue is
covered by the local statutes prohibiting assault.
Given this distinction, Dante (in Part IV) arguably falls into the sec-
ond category of legal impossibility. It is not as though he thinks that there
is a distinct law out there that covers sex with people under 25. Rather, he
is aware that there are statutory rape laws and just radically misunder-
stands them in at least one respect, the element about age of majority. It
is therefore misleading to suggest that legal impossibility involves nothing
more than trying to break a law that does not exist. This characterization
captures only the first kind of legal impossibility. It is more accurate to
suggest that some, if not many or even most, legal-impossibility cases in-
volve not so much trying to break a law that does not exist as trying to
break a law that does exist by acting in a manner that falls well outside
the scope of the law.
It is very important that we recognize this second kind of legal im-
possibility. If we were to think of legal impossibility in only the first
way—as the defense of “crazy” people who simply make up laws and
then project them on to the world—my plea to resurrect the impossibility
defense would be less urgent. There would not be any law under which to
charge them in the first place. And even if there were, the insanity de-
fense would often apply more accurately than the impossibility defense.
Once we realize that very normal people might be aware of various crimi-
nal laws and yet significantly misunderstand them—as both Dante and
Sam in the second situation do—the case for reinstating the legal-impos-
sibility version of the impossibility defense becomes much stronger.
Indeed, the whole reason that the MPC and most jurisdictions abol-
ished the impossibility defense is because there was so much confusion
about the distinction between factual impossibility and legal impossibil-
81. See supra Part .
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ity.82 This abolition makes complete sense if their only worry was that
defendants who had committed factually impossible attempts were con-
fusing juries or judges into buying their bogus legal-impossibility de-
fenses. But this should not have been their only worry. If factual
impossibility and legal impossibility are so easy to confuse, then there is
an equal and opposite threat that defendants who have committed legally
impossible attempts are being unfairly charged, tried, and/or punished be-
cause police, prosecutors, judges, and juries mistake this legal impossibil-
ity for factual impossibility. To address this injustice, then, the answer is
not to abolish or abandon the impossibility defense altogether. On the
contrary, it is to resurrect the defense and make very clear the distinction
between factual and legal impossibility (as I have in Part IV) so that
judges and juries will no longer have such difficulty applying them.
B. Importance Is Not a Function of Frequency
Regarding the second objection at the beginning of this Part—again,
the objection that legal-impossibility cases are much rarer than factual-
impossibility cases—I offer two responses. First, as I argued in the previ-
ous section, while there is no precise evidence about how frequently peo-
ple are charged, tried, and convicted for breaking laws that either do not
exist or that do exist but do not cover their supposedly despicable acts,
there is good reason to think that the number is high—at least high
enough that our criminal justice system should make the legal-impossibil-
ity defense available to them.83
Second, even if legal-impossibility cases were rare, this would hardly
be a good reason not to take them seriously. Consider two analogies.
First, since 1976, there have been fewer than 1400 executions.84 This is a
very small number as compared with the hundreds of thousands of homi-
cides that have occurred during the same time period.85 But the fact that
capital punishment is so rarely exercised does not at all mean that it does
not raise serious ethical, legal, and international issues. Second, only a
very small percentage of defendants invoke the insanity defense, and only
a very small percentage of this already very small percentage are actually
82. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
83. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
84. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).
85.  See James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, Homicide Trends in the United
States (1976-2005), BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/htius.pdf; Erica L. Smith & Alexia Cooper, Homicide in the U.S. Known to Law
Enforcement, 2011, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/hus11.pdf.
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acquitted on the basis of insanity.86 Yet it is still very important for juris-
dictions to determine whether or not they will offer the insanity defense
and, if they do, how exactly they will define and apply it.87
VII. PUTTING THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFENSE TO WORK
(SORT OF): CAUSATION IMPOSSIBILITY
There is one last problem in the impossibility domain that needs to
be resolved: the problem of how to handle the “Voodoo” scenario. I will
argue in this Part that practitioners of witchcraft and other forms of
psychic causation are excellent candidates for something like the legal-
impossibility version of the impossibility defense and therefore just one
more reason why it needs to be resurrected.
Consider Cheney. Cheney is an associate at a law firm and happens
to believe in such paranormal phenomena as voodoo and telekinesis.88 On
January 5, 2014, Ray, a partner, told Cheney that he is not as smart as he
thinks and needs to improve his writing. Cheney, who cannot take criti-
cism, thought that these comments were completely uncalled for. Several
days later, Cheney informed several associates both in person and by
email that, in reaction to this incident, he made a voodoo doll, which he
named “Ray”; that he had been poking the Ray doll with pins on a
nightly basis since January 5 while chanting a curse; and that the goal of
this activity was to cause Ray an early death.
86. See Heather Leigh Stangle, Murderous Madonna: Femininity, Violence, and
the Myth of Postpartum Mental Disorder in Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Filicide,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 728 (2008) (“[T]he insanity defense ‘has been estimated
to be successful in less than 0.1 [percent] (1 in 1000) of all criminal trials.’”) (footnote
omitted); Stephen G. Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study
of Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Nego-
tiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1723 (2005) (“While surveys have shown that the
public believes the [insanity] defense is raised in as many as 50% of all trials, in reality
the defense is raised infrequently, with one study reporting its use in only 0.9% of all
felony indictment cases tried. That same study further reports that only 26% of those
seeking the defense are acquitted; the majority are sent to a mental hospital. This
survey’s results, while not limited to trial settings, parallel these statistics . . . . [T]he
reported occurrence and success rates for insanity defenses are 0.87% and 23.55%,
respectively—which places this study’s findings in the same range of findings by other
studies.”) (footnotes omitted).
87. See generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 299 (John Deigh &
David Dolinko eds., 2011).
88. I draw much of this example from Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: Crimi-
nally Responsible but Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And
to Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1299, 1382 (2011).
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On January 12, two of Cheney’s fellow associates became worried
and contacted the local police. Officer Corbett called Cheney in and
talked with him for about twenty minutes. After hearing Cheney’s side of
the story, Officer Corbett instructed Cheney to “give it up,” try not to
“blow things out of proportion,” and focus instead on his work. Cheney
agreed. But that same night, Cheney resumed trying to kill Ray with his
voodoo doll.
On January 19, after fourteen straight days of practicing voodoo,
Cheney was getting frustrated that his efforts to kill Ray were unsuccess-
ful. So he changed his tactics. He now tried to kill Ray through a different
technique: telekinesis. Specifically, Cheney sat in his office and concen-
trated very hard on causing a flower vase on Ray’s shelf to fall on Ray’s
head and kill him. The same two associates who had previously called the
police saw Cheney concentrating deeply and asked him why. Cheney ex-
plained, at which point they immediately called the police once again.
This time, the police traveled to Cheney’s office and took him down to
the station for questioning.
Officer Corbett asked Cheney what he would do if his efforts con-
tinued to fail. Would he “resort to something more direct, like using a
gun, a knife, a bomb, or even another person like a friend or a hit man to
do the ‘dirty work’?” Cheney answered, “Absolutely and unequivocally
no. Never! There is no way I would let myself get caught. I’m too smart
for that and have too much to lose. That’s why I was trying to use ‘action
at a distance.’ Besides, there is no law against this.” Still, Officer Corbett
decided to arrest Cheney for attempted murder.
Is Officer Corbett right? Is Cheney guilty of attempted murder?
This is a tough call. Our intuitions are seriously conflicted. On the one
hand, Cheney did try to kill Ray, and there was plenty of evidence—
notably his admissions—that he satisfied both the actus reus and mens
rea for attempt. On the other hand, most of us do not believe in telekine-
sis or voodoo and therefore think that it was impossible for his attempts
to succeed.
Does the latter point constitute a successful defense? Many people’s
intuition before learning much about the impossibility defense and the
distinction between factual and legal impossibility is that it does consti-
tute a successful defense, that Cheney is not guilty.89 They reason that his
attempts were so far from possible success—so absurd—that, whether or
89. See Westen, supra note 48, at 536 (“My students disagree about whether all
instances of Voodoo are exculpatory. However, when they are asked to pass judgment
on [a person, Mildred, who tries to kill her ex-husband using Voodoo] as if they were
prosecutors, they agree that, whether or not Mildred deserves God’s punishment for
endeavoring to kill an innocent person, the state would be abusing its power if, given
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not they technically meet the criteria for attempt, Cheney really has done
nothing wrong, that he could not have been very serious about killing
Ray,90 that he is not dangerous,91 and therefore that it would be unjust to
punish him.92 Indeed, to punish Cheney for trying to kill Ray with voodoo
is almost as unjust as punishing him merely for hoping that Ray would
die.93 After learning about impossibility, however, some people’s intu-
itions might shift. They might reason that because Cheney’s mistake—
specifically, his mistaken belief that voodoo and telekinesis work—is fac-
tual, not legal, he is guilty of attempted murder.
Still, this latter response is problematic for two reasons. First, once
again, it conflicts with our pre-theoretical intuition—that is, the intuition
Mildred’s mistake of fact, the state officially declared her to be an ‘attempted mur-
derer’ and made it part of her public record.”).
90. See Hasnas, supra note 2, at 65 (“Pushing needles into voodoo images, casting
spells, or even firing toy phasers at one’s intended victim may adequately demonstrate
the defendant’s desire for the victim’s death. However, such actions do not demon-
strate the fixity of purpose usually required for criminal punishment.”).
91. See FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 177 (“A more convincing subjectivist argu- R
ment is that superstitious actors are not dangerous. . . . The supposition is that those
who try to kill by incantations either know in their hearts that their activity is harm-
less, or are so out of touch that they could not competently execute a plan to kill by
more rational means.”); Hasnas, supra note 2, at 74 (arguing against “liability for R
irrational attempts because even though the conduct of one engaged in an irrational
attempt may suggest that he or she desires a criminal end, such conduct ‘would not
impress the average, moderately enlightened observer as being a serious menace to
his feeling of safety.’”) (citation omitted).
92. See United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[S]ticking pins
in voodoo dolls [is not] attempted murder. Booksellers and practitioners of the occult
pose no social dangers, certainly none of the magnitude of those who are tricked into
shooting bags of sand that have been substituted for targets of assassination.”);
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.01 cmt. at 315–16 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985) (“[I]f the means [of an attempt] selected were absurd, there
is good ground for doubting that the actor really planned to commit a
crime. . . . Using impossibility as a guide to dangerousness of personality presents se-
rious difficulties. What is needed is a guideline that can inform judgment in particular
cases . . . . Such a vehicle is provided in Section 5.05(2), which authorizes the court to
reduce the grade of the offense, or dismiss the prosecution, in situations where the
conduct charged to constitute an attempt is ‘so inherently unlikely to result or
culminate in the commission of a crime that neither such conduct nor the actor
presents a public danger warranting’ the normal grading of the offense as an attempt.
Section 5.05(2) thus takes account of those cases where neither the offender nor his
conduct presents a serious threat to the public.”) (footnotes omitted).
93. See Levy, supra note 13, at 631 n.56; see also Rogers, supra note 2, at 341 R
(“[H]istorical reluctance to punish defendants for unconsummated crimes led to the
late development of attempt as a crime. This reluctance stemmed from a fear of pun-
ishing for thoughts alone when no outward harm occurred.”) (footnotes omitted).
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we have before learning about the distinction between factual and legal
impossibility—that Cheney is not guilty. (I will defend this intuition
below.)
Second, the notion that Cheney is making a factual mistake does not
seem quite right. We cannot be that confident that Cheney is making a
factual mistake because, for all we know, voodoo and telekinesis (and
other forms of “bizarre causation”) may in fact work for some people on
some occasions.94 Many people all around the globe believe that these
techniques can work.95 So it would be arrogant and close-minded to dis-
miss them out of hand. Instead, we would need to prove that these tech-
niques can never work. And it is unclear how we would prove this
negative. Perhaps with more talent or skill in the paranormal arts, Che-
ney might have succeeded in killing Ray.96 Indeed, one wonders just how
some judges or juries would regard these practices if Ray had in fact died
between January 5 and January 20 because of a sudden accident—espe-
cially the vase falling on his head.
I conclude that Cheney is not necessarily making a factual mistake.
But, strangely enough, he does not seem to be making a legal mistake
either. When he stated in his conversation with Officer Corbett that the
techniques he was using to kill Ray did not themselves violate the law, he
may very well have been right. I do not believe that any jurisdiction bans
the practice of voodoo or telekinesis. (These practices are likely permit-
ted simply because most people—at least most judges and legislators—do
not believe that they work.) For this reason alone, Cheney may not be
guilty.
So instead of forcing Cheney into the factual-impossibility category
or into the legal-impossibility category—a task that, either way, amounts
to jamming a square peg into a round hole—we should recognize a third
category to handle him, a category that has been referred to as inherent
94. Cf. MICHIO KAKU, PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE: HOW SCIENCE WILL SHAPE
HUMAN DESTINY AND OUR DAILY LIVES BY THE YEAR 2100 62–64 (2011) (predict-
ing that, with technological advances, human beings will eventually have telekinetic
powers).
95. See, e.g., Christine A. Corcos, Prosecutors and Psychics on the Air: Does a
‘Psychic Detective Effect’ Exist?, in IN LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL SCREEN
(Jessica Silbey and Peter Robson eds., 2012) (explaining how psychic detective and
reality shows manipulate their large audiences into believing that certain individuals
have special, paranormal powers that enable them to solve murder mysteries).
96. See FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 177 (“We have so little experience with black R
magic in modern industrial society that it is difficult to know whether [the supposition
that those who practice black magic could not competently execute a plan to kill by
more rational means] is correct.”).
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impossibility97 and intrinsic impossibility98 but which I will refer to more
transparently as causation impossibility.
If we accept causation impossibility as a third kind of impossibility
in addition to factual impossibility and legal impossibility, then Cheney
did not really make a factual or legal mistake. Instead, he made a theoreti-
cal mistake. He adopted—and tried to implement—a weak theory of cau-
sation, specifically the theory that (a) voodoo and telekinesis work and
(b) he was one of the few people in the world who could make them
work. Both of these propositions are implausible.99 Proposition (b) is es-
pecially implausible given Cheney’s track record between Jan. 5 and Jan.
20.
Given the implausibility of (a) and (b), it seems to follow that Che-
ney is more like Dante than Boris. Just as Dante overestimated the age of
majority, Cheney overestimated the power of voodoo. Both are living in
their own worlds—in “bubbles”—completely out of touch with reality.
Cheney’s resemblance to Dante, then, may explain many people’s initial
(and final?) intuition that Cheney cannot be guilty of attempted murder.
He is too far “out there” to be considered culpable.100
97. See United States v. Heng Awkak Roman, 356 F.Supp. 434 at 438 (S.D. N.Y.
1973) (“‘Inherent impossibility’ is where the means chosen are totally ineffective to
bring about the desired result . . . .”).
98. See People v. Rollino, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (describing intrin-
sic impossibility as “‘arising when the means used by the actor are ineffectual in them-
selves. . . . (shooting with defective gun).’”) (citation omitted).
99. See Donnelly, supra note 19, at 67–68 (“The person who sets out to do some-
thing that they know cannot be done—the absurd actor whose attempt at the impossi-
ble is self-contradictory—does not understand the basic relations of cause and effect.
Indeed, he thinks something like: ‘I can bring something about without bringing it
about.’ Attempts (involving voodoo for example) are not self-contradictory in this
way but come close to the same level of absurdity. In these attempts, the attempter
understands cause and effect but is incapable of connecting the reasons for the failure
of his attempt to that failure. More so these are the same reasons which prompt the
attempter to act in the first place. . . . In the voodoo example . . . the defendant will
not appreciate that the attempt is bound to fail when told of the facts that lead to
failure. The latter defendant may well know that society at large does not believe that
voodoo can cause death, but he is not interested in how other people treat cause and
effect; he has his own interpretation of the physical world that operates just through
mere belief rather than understanding.”) (footnote omitted).
100. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344, 348 (Pa. 1933) (“Even though a
‘voodoo doctor’ just arrived here from Haiti actually believed that his malediction
would surely bring death to the person on whom he was invoking it, I cannot conceive
of an American court upholding a conviction of such a maledicting ‘doctor’ for at-
tempted murder or even attempted assault and battery . . . . A malediction arising out
of a murderous intent is not such a substantial overt act that it would support a charge
of attempted murder.”); FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 180 (“The real reason for ex- R
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Some might argue that Cheney should still be punished for at-
tempted murder simply because he has proven himself to be a dangerous
person.101 What makes him dangerous is the fact that he wanted Ray to
die and tried to make this happen. Indeed, if Ray learned about Cheney’s
behavior between Jan. 5 and Jan. 20, we would not at all consider him to
empting black magic attempts from liability is that these superstitious techniques
amuse rather than disturb the average person.”); FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 166
(“The consensus of Western legal systems is that there should be no liability, regard-
less of the wickedness of intent, for sticking pins in a doll or chanting an incantation to
banish one’s enemy to the nether world. Against the background of the fears and
taboos prevailing in modern Western society, objectivist theorists take these cases to
be inapt attempts, therefore exempt from punishment.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 177
(“The supposition is that those who try to kill by incantations either know in their
hearts that their activity is harmless, or are so out of touch that they could not compe-
tently execute a plan to kill by more rational means.”); Donnelly, supra note 18, at 68
n.44 (“[W]here the actor is not prepared to kill by more conventional means [than
voodoo] there should be no liability for attempted murder.”); John F. Preis, Witch
Doctors and Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of Exculpation in Entrapment Cases, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1869, 1903–04 (1999) (“[T]he defense of inherent impossibility has
been recognized, if not always applied, by many state and federal courts. Many state
legislatures have joined the judiciary in deciding that inherently impossible attempts
should not be punished. . . . In addition to courts and legislatures, major criminal law
commentators have recognized the existence of an inherent impossibility defense.”)
(footnote omitted). But see Wagner, supra note 2, at 1067–68 (“[R]ather than asking R
whether something was inherently impossible, courts should treat all attempts the
same and simply examine whether the requisite mens rea and an overt act were pre-
sent. If there is genuinely no doubt that the defendant truly intended to commit the
crime (for instance, killing the voodoo victim . . . ), then the defendant indeed poses a
threat to society as he might resort to other means once the initial method fails. If the
intent to harm is present, why should law enforcement be forced to wait until these
defendants find a more effective way to carry out their plans? The most consistent
approach is to hold such individuals criminally liable, even though it may be difficult
to demonstrate that defendants who take ‘silly’ actions to cause harm truly had the
requisite mens rea.”); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Ac-
complice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 444 (“Sticking pins in a voodoo doll is
attempted murder if the actor believes such action will kill the person the doll repre-
sents. Such extreme lack of any objective risk is to be taken into account, if at all, only
as a matter of a court’s sentencing discretion.”) (footnote omitted).
101. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(b) n.88 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (“Cases can be imagined in which it might well be accurate to say
that the nature of the means selected, say black magic, substantially negates danger-
ousness of character. On the other hand, there are many cases as well where one who
tries to commit a crime by what he later learns to be inadequate methods will recog-
nize the futility of his course of action and seek more efficacious means.”); FLETCHER,
supra note 8, at 175–76 (“The Model Penal Code boldly suggests that cases in which R
the act is ‘inherently unlikely to result’ in the commission of a crime should be re-
solved by a judicial inquiry into whether the actor ‘presents a public danger.’”) (foot-
note and citation omitted).
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be irrational or overreacting if he sought a restraining order against Che-
ney. Even if Ray did not believe in voodoo or telekinesis, he would have
every reason to worry that Cheney would resort to different, more effec-
tive techniques (such as shooting a gun) once he became frustrated with
his ineffective techniques.102
While this concern about dangerousness certainly has merit, danger-
ousness alone is not a sufficient basis for criminal punishment. Danger-
ousness may serve as an aggravating factor that warrants additional
punishment, but it may not serve as the predicate crime itself.103 Yet it is
precisely this precept that would be violated if Cheney were punished for
102. See Hasnas, supra note 2, at 41 (“[T]here are many cases as well where one R
who tries to commit a crime by what he later learns to be inadequate methods will
recognize the futility of his course of action and seek more efficacious means. There
are, in other words, many instances of dangerous character revealed by ‘impossible’
attempts . . . .”) (quoting Model Penal Code §5.01 cmt. 3(b) n.88); Keith L. Alexan-
der, D.C. Man Who Used Voodoo To Try to Kill His Wife Sentenced to 4 Years in
Prison, WASHINGTON POST, March 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
man-who-used-voodoo-to-try-to-kill-his-wife-sentenced-to-4-years-in-prison/2013/03/
26/31770ad0-962f-11e2-8b4e-0b56f26f28de_story.html; Area Freeper, Lesbian Couple
Pleads Guilty of Attempted Murder, FREE REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 2004, http://
www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1190147/posts,. But see Donnelly, supra note 18,
at 64–65 (“[T]he defendant who attempts to kill by voodoo may lack the harmfulness
that is normally present in an attempter . . . . [He is] at least is harmless in respect of
the end. There is no immediate potential for the harm to occur nor, usually, is there
any obvious suggestion that these sorts of defendants will try again by more effective
means. In contrast, the defendant who attempts to shoot his intended victim, not
knowing that the target is just out of range, is likely to try again and succeed. . . . [I]t
appears likely . . . that in some extraordinary attempts the reasons for failure may
provide evidence of/disclose my inability to be harmful in a criminally relevant way in
the first place.”); id. at 67 (“This defendant is insufficiently harmful because (a) even
with full knowledge, he cannot understand that such an attempt will lead to failure
and (b) he performs his attempt because of those factors that lead inevitably to fail-
ure. An attempter of this sort is ineffective . . . .”); Hasnas, supra note 2, at 66 R
(“Whatever the number of irrational attemptors, it can be only a very small percent-
age who actually have the will to try again with more effective means.”).
103. See FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 180 (“[A] basic principle of liberal jurispru- R
dence [is] that criminal law and punishment should attach to actions as abstracted
from the personal histories and propensities of those who engage in them. People
make themselves subject to punishment because of what they do, not by virtue of
their inherent potential to do harm.”) (footnote omitted); Susan Gellman, Sticks and
Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional
and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 363 (1991)
(making the analogous point that while hatred alone cannot be punished, it can serve
as an aggravating factor for certain crimes) (footnotes omitted); Albert W. Alschuler,
Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due
Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 551 (1986) (“Blackstone’s familiar declaration that ‘to
make a complete crime . . . there must be both a will and an act’ expressed a funda-
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practicing voodoo. His punishment would be not for committing a dan-
gerous act but for exhibiting a dangerous character. And exhibiting a
dangerous character by itself simply does not qualify as attempted mur-
der, no less probable cause for arrest.
Even the subjectivist MPC agrees with this point. Recall MPC
§5.01(1) from Part V.A:
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the
crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them
to be . . . .104
By itself, this provision seems to imply that Cheney is guilty of attempted
murder simply because he purposely engaged in conduct that would have
killed Ray if his belief in the effectiveness of (his) voodoo had been cor-
rect. But MPC §5.05 makes a qualified exception to this subjectivist ap-
proach for causation impossibility:
If the particular conduct charged to constitute a criminal attempt,
solicitation or conspiracy is so inherently unlikely to result or
culminate in the commission of a crime that neither such conduct
nor the actor presents a public danger warranting the grading of
such offense under this Section, the Court shall . . . enter judg-
ment and impose sentence for a crime of lower grade or degree
or, in extreme cases, may dismiss the prosecution.105
The MPC, then, is not suggesting that Cheney should get off scot-free. It
is suggesting only that if he is punished at all, he should be punished for a
lesser offense than attempted murder.106
Still, the problem remains: what offense? If not attempted murder,
what? Attempted voodoo murder? While this characterization would be
more accurate, there are two problems with this proposal. First, the legal-
mental principle, the refusal to punish or detain for dangerous propensities alone.”)
(footnotes omitted).
104. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
106. See Hasnas, supra note 2, at 41 (“[T]he authors of the [MPC] would argue R
that . . . cases [involving causation impossibility] should not be viewed in isolation. [A
voodoo practitioner’s] attempt may have been irrational in that it employed means
that a reasonable person would know could not accomplish his objective, but it
demonstrated his willingness to take another’s life and hence his dangerousness.
Since, according to the [MPC], the purpose of punishing attempts is to subject those
who pose a danger to their fellow citizens to criminal sanction, [the voodoo practi-
tioner] is a proper candidate for punishment.”).
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ity principle would prevent the state from charging this crime unless it
had previously drafted a statute explicitly prohibiting attempted murder
by means of implausible causal theories. Second, it is difficult to see how
a state could justify criminalizing such an attempt in the first place.
Criminalizing attempted murder by means of implausible causal theories
seems dangerously close to criminalizing the sincere hope that somebody
dies accompanied by the slightest act in this direction—for example, a
diary entry. And this kind of infringement on a person’s thoughts is not
only unjust; it is unconstitutional.107
VIII. CONCLUSION
The impossibility defense has baffled legal scholars, courts, and at-
torneys. This defense is especially difficult for two main reasons. First, it
is not obvious which kinds of attempts it exculpates, which kinds of at-
tempts it does not exculpate, and why it works only for the former and
not the latter. Second, courts that have not resolved the first set of diffi-
culties have only compounded the confusion by misstating and misapply-
ing the impossibility defense. In particular, they have mistaken factual
impossibility for legal impossibility and have interpreted certain factual-
impossibility situations as hybrid-impossibility situations. As I explained
in the Introduction, all of this confusion led the MPC to give up on the
impossibility defense, and most jurisdictions then followed the MPC.108
It is important to clarify these matters partly for theoretical tidiness
but mostly to encourage the many jurisdictions that have effectively bur-
ied the legal impossibility defense to open up their jurisprudential coffins
and release this excuse back into their statutes. It is one thing to reject a
defense because it is invalid. It is another thing to reject a defense be-
cause it is conceptually difficult. The latter reason is unjustified and espe-
cially unwarranted in a system that prides itself on the creation,
development, refinement, and application of far more complicated legal
concepts and theories than legal impossibility.
107. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The government
‘cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a per-
son’s private thoughts.’ First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the gov-
ernment seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The
right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of thought.”) (citation omitted); Jennifer
B. Siverts, Punishing Thoughts Too Close to Reality: A New Solution to Protect Chil-
dren from Pedophiles, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 393, 416 (2005) (“Clearly, the Court
cannot constitutionally punish a person based on thoughts alone.”).
108. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
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To be sure, the few defendants who believe in non-existent laws are
probably not much at risk. If they are even charged with trying to break
entirely non-existent laws, the courts will more likely question their sanity
than their guilt. Instead, the defendants who are much more at risk are
the ones who have an unrealistic understanding of existing laws. Con-
sider, for example, an individual who is aware of harassment laws and
believes—mistakenly—that these laws prohibit denying the Holocaust on
Facebook. If she were then charged with harassment, she might very well
have a legitimate legal-impossibility defense (not to mention a legitimate
First Amendment defense). Remarkably, however, she would not be per-
mitted to invoke this defense in most jurisdictions.
More generally, suppose that an individual commits what many peo-
ple would consider to be a heinous act and that there is no law against the
performance of this act. Idealists assume that the criminal justice system
will simply leave her alone. After all, nullem crimen sine lege. But this
kind of idealism is naı¨ve and unrealistic. The police may arrest her any-
way, the prosecutor may focus entirely on the defendant’s moral weak-
ness, and the jury may reason that, even though no law really covers the
act in question, some other law that the legislature never passed should
have covered the act, especially considering that the defendant believed
that this law existed. In other words, the jury may actually end up using
the defendant’s mistaken belief that she was breaking a law against her
when this is precisely what the legal-impossibility version of the impossi-
bility defense was designed to protect against. In order to prevent this
kind of injustice, courts and legislatures need to abandon the MPC and
restore the impossibility defense to its rightful place among the tradition-
ally recognized excuses.
